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Human societies have long used the capability of argumentation and dialogue to overcome
and resolve conﬂicts that may arise within their communities. Today, there is an increasing
level of interest in the application of such dialogue games within artiﬁcial agent societies.
In particular, within the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems, this theory of argumentation and
dialogue games has become instrumental in designing rich interaction protocols and in
providing agents with a means to manage and resolve conﬂicts. However, to date, much of
the existing literature focuses on formulating theoretically sound and complete models for
multi-agent systems. Nonetheless, in so doing, it has tended to overlook the computational
implications of applying such models in agent societies, especially ones with complex
social structures. Furthermore, the systemic impact of using argumentation in multi-
agent societies and its interplay with other forms of social inﬂuences (such as those that
emanate from the roles and relationships of a society) within such contexts has also
received comparatively little attention. To this end, this paper presents a signiﬁcant step
towards bridging these gaps for one of the most important dialogue game types; namely
argumentation-based negotiation (ABN). The contributions are three fold. First, we present
a both theoretically grounded and computationally tractable ABN framework that allows
agents to argue, negotiate, and resolve conﬂicts relating to their social inﬂuences within a
multi-agent society. In particular, the model encapsulates four fundamental elements: (i) a
scheme that captures the stereotypical pattern of reasoning about rights and obligations
in an agent society, (ii) a mechanism to use this scheme to systematically identify social
arguments to use in such contexts, (iii) a language and a protocol to govern the agent
interactions, and (iv) a set of decision functions to enable agents to participate in such
dialogues. Second, we use this framework to devise a series of concrete algorithms that give
agents a set of ABN strategies to argue and resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent task allocation
scenario. In so doing, we exemplify the versatility of our framework and its ability to
facilitate complex argumentation dialogues within artiﬁcial agent societies. Finally, we carry
out a series of experiments to identify how and when argumentation can be useful for
agent societies. In particular, our results show: a clear inverse correlation between the
beneﬁt of arguing and the resources available within the context; that when agents operate
with imperfect knowledge, an arguing approach allows them to perform more effectively
than a non-arguing one; that arguing earlier in an ABN interaction presents a more eﬃcient
method than arguing later in the interaction; and that allowing agents to negotiate their
social inﬂuences presents both an effective and an eﬃcient method that enhances their
performance within a society.
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Autonomous agents usually exist within a multi-agent community, performing actions within a shared social context
to achieve their individual and collective objectives [81]. In such situations, the actions of these individual agents are in-
ﬂuenced via two broad forms of motivations. First, the internal inﬂuences reﬂect the intrinsic motivations that drive the
individual agent to achieve its own internal objectives. Second, as agents reside and operate within a social community, the
social context itself inﬂuences their actions. For instance, when agents function within a society that has an organisational
structure, they may assume certain speciﬁc roles or be part of certain relationships. These, in turn, may inﬂuence the actions
that an agent may perform. Here, we categorise such external forms of motivations as social inﬂuences.
Now, in many cases, both these forms of inﬂuence are present and they may give conﬂicting motivations to the individual
agent. For instance, an agent may be internally motivated to perform a speciﬁc action. However, at the same time, it may
also be subject to an external social inﬂuence (via the role it is assuming or the relationship that it is part of) not to
do so. To illustrate this more clearly, let us consider an example relationship that exists between the two roles supervisor
and student.1 Assume that, as a result of this supervisor-student relationship, any agent who assumes the role of student
is socially inﬂuenced to produce and hand over his thesis to his supervisor in a timely manner. Therefore, if an agent
named Andy assumes the role of the student and another named Ben assumes the role of his supervisor, Andy will be
socially inﬂuenced by Ben to hand over the thesis in time. However, if Andy also has a certain internal motivation to use
that limited time on some other activity (i.e., ﬁnish some programming work), a conﬂict will arise between Andy’s social
inﬂuence and his internal inﬂuence. In such a case, if Andy decides to pursue his internal motivation at the expense of
his social inﬂuence, this may, in turn, manifest itself as a conﬂict between the two agents since Ben may well have an
interest in Andy abiding by his social inﬂuence and hand over his thesis in time. Also an agent may face situations where
different social inﬂuences motivate it in a contradictory manner (one to perform a speciﬁc action and the other a different
conﬂicting action). For instance, if Andy is also part of a project, his project manager (Cindy) may socially inﬂuence Andy
to use his time integrating some software component. Similar to above, in such an event, if the agent decides to abide by a
certain social inﬂuence and forgo the other, it may also lead to a conﬂict between that agent and the agent that exerts the
neglected social inﬂuence.
In addition to such disparate motivations, due to the complexity and dynamism usually present within multi-agent sys-
tems, in many cases, agents have to carry out their actions with imperfect knowledge about their environment. Speciﬁcally,
when agents operate within a social context, they may not have complete knowledge about the capabilities, roles, or rela-
tionships that they and their counterparts are deemed to assume within the society. Thus, in such instances, an agent may
not be aware of the existence of all the social inﬂuences that could or indeed should affect its actions. For instance, Andy
may not be aware that Cindy was appointed as the new project manager. Thus, he may not believe that he is required to
perform any integration work that Cindy may demand of him. Moreover, agents may also lack the knowledge of certain
speciﬁc social and internal inﬂuences that motivate other agents’ actions within the community. For instance, Andy may not
be aware of the fact that the university will incur a large penalty if the project integration is not completed in time. Thus,
due to the absence of this knowledge, he may chose to write his thesis believing it is more important than the integration
work. As can be seen, therefore, the lack of knowledge about social inﬂuences can also lead to conﬂicts between agents.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that when agents operate in a society with incomplete information and with
diverse and conﬂicting inﬂuences, they may, in certain instances, lack the knowledge, the motivation and/or the capacity
to abide by all their social inﬂuences. However, to function as a coherent society it is important for these agents to have
a means to resolve such conﬂicts, manage their internal and social inﬂuences, and, thus, come to a mutual understanding
about their actions.
In searching for a solution to this problem, we observe that when individuals operate within a human society, they
encounter similar forms of conﬂicts in their day to day life. For instance, when carrying out their actions humans encounter
inﬂuences from different elements within the society, some of which are in conﬂict with one another. Furthermore, they
also perform their actions in the presence of incomplete information about their social context. Thus, they also face conﬂicts
due to their lack of knowledge about certain inﬂuences within the society. However, mainly due to their skill in language,
dialogue, and debate, human beings have adapted to use different forms of complex interactions to manage and resolve such
conﬂicts. To this end, researchers and philosophers from different branches of AI, linguistics, dialogue theory, and logic have
long been inspired by this human social ability and have tried to capture and model such behaviour [53,75]. Such studies
have given birth to a number of different dialogue models [80] suited to achieve different objectives (i.e., persuasion [1],
negotiation [47,66], inquiry [29], deliberation [45], team formation [14] and decision support [26,82]; refer to Section 2 for
more details).
Building on these insights, much recent literature has advocated the Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN) dialogue type
as a promising way of dealing with the aforementioned conﬂicts in multi-agent systems (for a detailed review see [6,59]).
In essence, the ABN form of a dialogue enhances the ways agents can interact within a negotiation encounter by allowing
them to exchange additional meta-information such as justiﬁcations, critics, and other forms of persuasive locutions within
their interactions. These, in turn, allow agents to gain a wider understanding of the internal and social inﬂuences affecting
1 We use this example throughout the paper to illustrate certain abstract notions more clearly.
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negotiation element within ABN also provides a means for the agents to achieve mutually acceptable agreements to the
conﬂicts that they may have in relation to their different inﬂuences. Such enhancements lead to richer forms of negotiation
within multi-agent systems than have hitherto been possible in game-theoretic [64] or heuristic-based [20] models and, by
so doing, we believe, ABN provides the desired mechanisms for multi-agent systems to function as a coherent society.
To date, however, much of the effort in the use of ABN in multi-agent systems suffer from a common fundamental
drawback. Speciﬁcally, it models and analyses systems within a two-agent context and, thereafter, attempts to extrapolate
or generalise the ﬁndings into a larger context with more than two-agents. But this reductionist approach largely ignores
the social context of a multi-agent system. In particular, the systemic impact of ABN in multi-agent systems, its usage as a
form of inﬂuence within a society, its co-existence with other forms of social inﬂuences in such systems, and how both ABN
and social inﬂuences interplay with each other within a social context has received little attention within the community.
Furthermore, most work focuses on the theoretical properties of the various ABN models. Thus, the soundness and com-
pleteness of such models have received far greater attention than their computational properties such as the eﬃciency and
effectiveness of implementing them. This lack of empirical studies is well documented [41] and has led many to observe
that there is a signiﬁcant gap between the theory and the practise in this area.
Against this background, the primary motivation of this paper is to model, experiment, and analyse a number of different
ways by which agents can use argumentative dialogues to resolve the aforementioned forms of conﬂicts that may occur
between agents in a multi-agent society. In particular, this paper builds upon our previous conceptual grounding [37–39]
and advances the state of the art in the use of argumentation in MAS in three major ways.
First, this paper presents a novel ABN framework that allows agents to detect, manage, and resolve conﬂicts related to
their social inﬂuences in a distributed manner within a structured agent society. The framework is composed of four main
elements; (i) a schema that captures how agents reason about inﬂuences within a structured society, (ii) a mechanism to
use this stereotypical pattern of reasoning to systematically identify a suitable set of social arguments, (iii) a language and a
protocol to exchange these arguments, and (iv) a decision making functionality to generate such dialogues. One of the main
unique features of this framework is the fact that it explicitly captures the social inﬂuences endemic to structured agent
societies. Moreover, it identiﬁes the different ways agents can use these inﬂuences constructively in their dialogues. Thus,
the framework leads the way to a thorough experimental analysis on the constructive interplay of ABN and social inﬂu-
ences. This interplay has not been suﬃciently addressed in the existing literature and, by so doing, this paper presents the
ﬁrst application of argumentation-inspired techniques to specify a dialogue-game for arguing about social inﬂuences. Fur-
thermore, our presumptive scheme for inferring social inﬂuences presents a new argumentation scheme [79] for reasoning
within structured societies, and the way we use our argument scheme to systematically identify arguments within an agent
society presents a successful attempt to use such schemes in a computational context. In all these different aspects, this
paper presents a strong theoretical contribution to both the argumentation and the multi-agent systems literature.
The second major contribution of this paper stems from its experimental analysis. In particular, we present the ﬁrst
extensive empirical evaluation of argumentation-based strategies within multi-agent systems. The lessons drawn from our
experiments make the claims about the usefulness of ABN more precise and better empirically backed than they have ever
been. This contrasts with the informal justiﬁcation of ABN found in most of the literature. More speciﬁcally, our results show
that allowing agents to argue during their negotiation interactions signiﬁcantly enhances their ability to resolve conﬂicts and,
thereby, increases the performance of the society even when functioning with high levels of incomplete information. We
also show that the beneﬁt of arguing is inversely correlated to the resources available within the system. More precisely, the
comparative advantage of arguing diminishes as the number of social inﬂuences (which act as resources) increase within the
society. Our results also show that arguing earlier in an ABN interaction presents a more eﬃcient method than arguing later
in the interaction. Moreover, we observe that allowing agents to trade social inﬂuences during their negotiations, enhances
their ability to re-allocate these social inﬂuences in a more useful manner and, thus, perform more eﬃciently and effectively
as a society.
The third set of contributions come from our work in bridging the theory to practise divide in argumentation re-
search. In particular, the types of social arguments and the strategies designed in this paper identify a number of different
ways in which argumentation can be useful in multi-agent systems. In particular, these strategies capture inspiration from
both the social science and the multi-agent systems literature (i.e., exercising the right to claim compensation, question
non-performance, negotiating social inﬂuence) and represent an array of ways of how agents can manage conﬂicts in a
multi-agent society. Moreover, we use our theoretical ABN framework to formulate concrete algorithms to model such ar-
gumentative strategies and, in turn, use them to resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent task allocation scenario. In so doing, the
paper starts to bridge the gap between theory and practise and provides a test-bed to evaluate how an ABN model can be
used to manage and resolve conﬂicts in multi-agent societies. Furthermore, in bringing these socially inspired techniques
forward, modelling them within an argumentation context, and encoding such behaviour in a computational environment,
this paper also adds signiﬁcant contributions to both the argumentation and the multi-agent systems community.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 reviews the state of the art identifying the different
ways the argumentation metaphor has inspired research with AI. It then situates our work within this domain and clearly
identiﬁes its scope and contributions. Given this context, Section 3 gives a formal representation of our argumentation
framework. Next, Section 4 maps this theoretical model to a computational context to evaluate how our argumentation
model can be used to manage and resolve conﬂicts within a social context. Subsequently, Section 5 presents our empirical
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evaluation on how agents can use our ABN framework to argue and negotiate eﬃciently and effectively in a multi-agent
society. Finally, Section 6 concludes by highlighting our main ﬁndings and future directions.
2. Related work
As stated above, this paper centres around two broad areas of AI; namely argumentation-based negotiation and multi-
agent systems. Thus, having explained how our work relates to multi-agent systems research (refer to Section 1), in this
section, we situate this paper in the broader context of argumentation in AI.
In more detail, argumentation has proven to be a useful metaphor for specifying a variety of computational models and
applications in AI. Depending on their objectives, these computational frameworks have applied this metaphor in quite dis-
tinct ways. In particular, we can characterise three major trends (refer to Fig. 1). The ﬁrst uses the notion of argumentation
as a metaphor for defeasible reasoning, in which conﬂicts within knowledge bases are resolved by analysing the way they
interact (e.g. through support, attack, conﬂict, etc.). The second uses individual argument schemes simply as structures for
instantiating rhetorical statements, mainly for natural language generation or advice generation in expert systems. Finally,
argumentation has also been used as a metaphor for deﬁning communicative interactions among artiﬁcial and/or human
agents. In the following, we brieﬂy survey each of these areas and, subsequently, situate our work in relation to it.
2.1. Argumentation as a metaphor for defeasible reasoning
One of the main challenges in specifying autonomous agents in the sort of dynamic and uncertain environments we
have discussed earlier is the maintenance and updating of agent beliefs. In such cases, an agent may receive perceptual
information that is inconsistent with its view of the world and would need to update its beliefs in order to maintain
consistency. Established ways of mechanising this kind of non-monotonic reasoning include truth maintenance systems [17],
default logic [63] and circumscription [48].
However, argumentation provides an alternative way to mechanise non-monotonic reasoning. Speciﬁcally, argument-
based frameworks view this problem as a process in which arguments for and against conclusions are constructed and
compared. Non-monotonicity arises from the fact that new premises may enable the construction of new arguments to
support new beliefs, or stronger counter-arguments against existing beliefs. For comprehensive surveys on argument-based
approaches to non-monotonic reasoning, see [12,57]. More recently, argumentation has been also used to perform non-
monotonic practical reasoning for situated autonomous agents (e.g. as in work by Pollock [55]).
However, this paper is not a contribution to argumentation-based defeasible reasoning. As such, we are not concerned
with the formal analysis of the relationships among arguments and the various semantic or computational characterisations
of argument acceptability. Instead, our focus is on using argumentation as a metaphor for characterising communication
among agents and in testing this communication empirically rather than analytically (refer to Section 5).
2.2. Argument as a metaphor for generating rhetorical statements
In many intelligent systems (e.g., expert systems or decision-support systems), there is often a need for the system to
generate persuasive statements to the user. In these systems, the argumentation metaphor has been used in a very different
way to the frameworks for symbolic defeasible reasoning presented in the previous subsection. Here, instead of being con-
cerned with evaluating (e.g. accepting or rejecting) arguments based on their interaction with other arguments, arguments
are seen as structures (or schema) for generating persuasive utterances for the user. These schemas, which capture stereo-
typical (deductive or non-deductive) patterns of reasoning found in everyday discourse, have been a focus of study of many
argumentation theorists (such as Walton [79] and Toulmin [75]). More information on argumentation for natural language
generation can be found in [24].
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argument schemes in devising our multi-agent communication protocol for generating arguments among agents because it
provides us a systematic way of extracting arguments within our social context (refer to Section 3.2).
2.3. Argumentation as a metaphor for dialogue games
The third major use of the argumentation metaphor in AI has been in the speciﬁcation of rich models of interaction
for resolving conﬂicts among autonomous agents. To specify such interactions, one needs to deﬁne: (i) a communication
protocol; and (ii) a set of decision mechanisms that enable agents to generate utterances and arguments using the protocol.
In terms of communication protocols, the inﬂuence of argumentation has manifested itself through the widespread adop-
tion of dialogue games. Such dialogue games deﬁne interactions between two or more players, where each player makes a
move by making some utterance in a common communication language, and according to some pre-deﬁned rules. Dialogue-
games have their roots in the philosophy of argumentation and were used as a tool for analysing fallacious arguments [27].
Walton and Krabbe [80] have identiﬁed various types of dialogues (such as information-seeking, persuasion, negotiation,
and deliberation dialogues) and used dialogue games to study the notion of commitment in dialogue. To this end, dialogue
games often employ the notion of a commitment store which tracks participants’ (explicit or implicit) dialogical commitments
during a conversation, which can be used to reveal fallacies in conversation.
In multi-agent systems, formal dialogue-game protocols have been presented for different atomic dialogue types [44],
such as inquiry [29], deliberation [45], team formation [14] and interest-based negotiation [58].
Argument schemes also offer a number of useful features for the speciﬁcation of dialogue game protocols. Their structure
helps reduce the computational cost of argument generation, since only certain types of propositions need to be established.
This very feature also reduces the cost of evaluating arguments. To this end, Atkinson et al. [4] use an argumentation scheme
for proposing actions to structure their dialogue-game protocol for arguing about action.
When it comes to decision mechanisms for generating dialogues, little work exists. Parsons et al. [51] use a set of generic
pre-deﬁned attitudes (e.g. conﬁdent, careful, cautious) and explore their impact on dialogue outcomes. Ramchurn et al. [60]
and Kraus et al. [40] use arguments inspired by work on the psychology of persuasion [33]. Key arguments used in human
persuasion are given computational representations, which are used to enable agents to generate a variety of arguments in
a resource allocation context. Pasquier et al. [52] also present a framework for argument generation and evaluation based
on a computational model of cognitive coherence theory.
The work presented in this paper is primarily a contribution to the use of argumentation as a metaphor for specifying
and implementing dialogue games to resolve conﬂicts about social inﬂuences in multi-agent systems (see Section 1). In more
detail, on one hand, this paper extends the state of the art in dialogue game protocols by presenting a new type of dialogue
protocol for arguing about social inﬂuences in a structured society. This protocol is presented with full operational semantics
(axiomatic semantics are discussed in a companion technical report), and is built on a scheme inspired by recent advances
in social inﬂuence in multi-agent systems. On the other hand, this paper also provides a signiﬁcant advancement to the
pragmatic aspects of argumentation in MAS by providing a complete generative model for dialogues, and an extensive set of
experiments to evaluate a variety of argument generation strategies. To date, no other generative framework has undertaken
similar empirical evaluation.
3. The argumentation framework
Having explained our motivation and the scope of this work within the argumentation domain, we now proceed to
explain our argumentation framework. In particular, here we present both a formal and computational framework that
allows agents to argue, negotiate, and resolve conﬂicts in the presence of social inﬂuences. In essence, our framework
consists of four main elements: (i) a schema that captures how agents reason about social inﬂuences, (ii) a set of social
arguments that make use of this schema, (iii) a language and protocol for facilitating dialogue about social inﬂuence, and
(iv) a set of decision functions that agents may use to generate dialogues within the protocol. In the following sub-sections
we discuss each of these elements in more detail.
3.1. The schema
As the ﬁrst step in modelling our argumentation framework, here we formulate a coherent mechanism to capture the
notion of social inﬂuences within a multi-agent society. As explained in Section 1, many different forms of external inﬂu-
ences affect the actions that an agent performs within a society. Moreover, these social inﬂuences emanate from different
elements of the society. In particular, many researchers now perceive a society as a collection of roles inter-connected via
a web of relationships [11,49]. These roles and relationships represent two important aspects of social inﬂuence within a
society. Speciﬁcally, when an agent operates within such a social context, it may assume certain speciﬁc roles, which will,
in turn, guide the actions it performs. In a similar manner, the relationships connecting the agents acting their respective
roles also inﬂuence the actions they perform. To date, an array of existing research, both in social science and in multi-agent
systems, attempts to capture the inﬂuences of these social factors on the behaviour of the individual (refer to [34]). Never-
theless, there is little in the way of consensus at an overarching level. Some tend to be overly prescriptive, advocating that
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approach, analysed at a theoretical level without evaluating its computational costs [16]. Against this background, in the
following we progressively introduce what we believe are a minimal set of key notions and explain how we adapt them to
build a coherent schema that captures the notion of social inﬂuence.
The notion of social commitment acts as our basic building block for capturing social inﬂuence. First introduced through
the works of Singh [70] and Castelfranchi [10], the notion of social commitment remains simple, yet expressive, and is ar-
guably one of the fundamental approaches for modelling social behaviour among agents in multi-agent systems. In essence,
a social commitment (SC) is a commitment by one agent to another to perform a stipulated action. More speciﬁcally, it is
deﬁned as a four tuple relation:
SC= (x, y, θ,w)
where x identiﬁes the agent who is socially committed to carry out the action (termed the debtor), y the agent to whom
the commitment is made (termed the creditor), θ the associated action, and w the witness of this social commitment. It is
important to note that, here, in the desire to maintain simplicity within our schema, we avoid incorporating the witness in
our future discussions (as Castelfranchi did in his subsequent expositions). For ease of reference, this allows us to denote
a social commitment that exists between a debtor x and a creditor y in relation to an action θ using the abbreviated
form SCx⇒yθ .
Having deﬁned social commitment, Castelfranchi further explains its consequences for both the agents involved. In detail,
a social commitment results in the debtor attaining an obligation toward the creditor, to perform the stipulated action. The
creditor, in turn, attains certain rights. These include the right to demand or require the performance of the action, the
right to question the non-performance of the action, and, in certain instances, the right to make good any losses suffered
due to its non-performance. We refer to these as rights to exert inﬂuence.2 This notion of social commitment resulting in an
obligation and rights to exert inﬂuence, allows us a means to capture social inﬂuences between two agents. Thus, when
a certain agent is socially committed to another to perform a speciﬁc action, the ﬁrst agent subjects itself to the social
inﬂuences of the other to perform that action. The ensuing obligation, on one hand, allows us to capture how an agent gets
subjected to the social inﬂuence of another, whereas, the rights to exert inﬂuence, on the other hand, model how an agent
gains the ability to exert such social inﬂuence upon another. Thereby, the notion of social commitment gives an elegant
mechanism to capture the social inﬂuences resulting between two agents.
However, within a society not all social commitments inﬂuence the agent to the same degree. Certain social commit-
ments may cause a stronger social inﬂuence than others. Furthermore, when agents operate in realistic and open multi-agent
societies, they may face situations where different social inﬂuences motivate them in a contradictory manner (as discussed
in Section 1). In order to capture such conﬂicts and conditions, here, we do not strictly adhere to the analysis of Castel-
franchi that an honest agent will always gain an internal commitment (resulting in an intention to perform that action) for
all its social commitments. On the contrary, in accordance with the work of Cavedon and Sonenberg [11] and Dignum et
al. [15,16], we believe that all social commitments encapsulate their own degree of inﬂuence that they exert upon the indi-
vidual. This will, in turn, result in agents being subjected to obligations with different degrees of inﬂuence. This, we believe,
is an important characteristic in realistic multi-agent societies, where autonomous agents are subjected to contradictory
external inﬂuences (which may also conﬂict with their internal inﬂuences). Therefore, if an agent is subjected to obligations
that either contradict or hinder each other’s performance, the agent will make a choice about which obligation to honour.3
In order to facilitate this form of reasoning about conﬂicting social inﬂuences, we associate with each social commitment
a degree of inﬂuence f . Thus, when a certain agent attains an obligation due to a speciﬁc social commitment, it subjects
itself to its associated degree of inﬂuence. To reﬂect this in our abbreviated notation, we incorporate this degree of inﬂuence
parameter f into the social commitment notation as SCx⇒y
θ, f .
Given this basic building block for modelling social inﬂuence between speciﬁc pairs of agents, we now proceed to explain
how this notion is extended to capture social inﬂuences resulting due to factors such as roles and relationships within a
wider multi-agent society (i.e., those that rely on the structure of the society, rather than the speciﬁc individuals who
happen to be committed to one another).
Speciﬁcally, since most relationships involve the related parties carrying out certain actions for each other, we can view
a relationship as an encapsulation of social commitments between the associated roles. To illustrate this, consider the
2 This representation of rights and obligations as correlated pairs (one the dual of the other) conforms to the Hohfeldian analysis of “jural correlatives”
where the two concepts are argued to be logically consistent within legal grounds and the existence of one necessarily implies the presence of the
other [28]. However, within a distributed multi-agent environment, individual agents may lack perfect knowledge. Thus, they may not be aware of certain
rights and obligations they hold within the society. In our work, since we aim to allow agents to argue and resolve such inconsistencies in knowledge (see
Sections 4 and 5), we represent both these notions of obligation and rights explicitly within our ABN framework.
3 From a deontic logic point of view, this notion of obligation is similar to that of a contrary-to-duty form [56]. A classic example is the moral dilemma
experienced by Sartre’s soldier [76]; the obligation by duty to kill and the moral obligation not to kill. Within the logic community, a number of different
variations of deontic logic have been proposed to formalise the semantics of such notions [25,56,65,76]. However, this paper does not attempt to formulate
a new form of logic or attempt to forward a logical approach to reason about such decisions. Our primary aim here is to empirically evaluate how agents
can argue, negotiate, and resolve such conﬂicts that may occur in multi-agent systems. A more detailed discussion on these logical approaches is found
in [34].
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Leads it to be part of the relationship p
With another agent a j acting the role r j
A social commitment SC
ri⇒r j
θ, f associated with p
• Leads to ai attaining an obligation O toward r j ,
Which subjects it to an inﬂuence of degree f
To perform the action θ
• And, in turn, leads to a j attaining the right  toward ri
Which gives it the ability to exert an inﬂuence of degree f
To demand, question, and require the performance of action θ
Fig. 2. Schema of social inﬂuence.
supervisor-student example introduced in Section 1. Now, let us consider the case where this supervisor-student relationship
socially inﬂuences the student to produce and hand over his thesis to the supervisor in a timely manner. This inﬂuence we
can perceive as a social commitment that exists between the roles supervisor and student (the student is socially committed
to the supervisor to perform the stipulated action). Here, within this social commitment, the student acts as the debtor and
the supervisor acts as the creditor. As a consequence of this social commitment, the student attains an obligation toward
the supervisor to carry out this related action. On the other hand, the supervisor gains the right to exert inﬂuence on the
student by either demanding that he does so or through questioning his non-performance. In a similar manner, in the same
supervisor-student relationship, consider a case where the supervisor is inﬂuenced to review and comment on the thesis.
This again is another social commitment associated with the relationship. However, in this instance the supervisor is the
debtor and the student the creditor. Thus, this social commitment subjects the supervisor to an obligation to review the
thesis while the student gains the right to demand its performance. In this manner, social commitment again provides an
effective means to capture the social inﬂuences emanating through roles and relationships of the society (independently of
the speciﬁc agents who take on the roles).
This extension to the basic deﬁnition of social commitment is inspired primarily by the work of Cavedon and Sonen-
berg [11]. However, it is important to note that our extension also broadens the original deﬁnition of social commitment
by allowing social commitments to exist between roles and not only between agents. In so doing, we relax the highly
constraining requirement present within Cavedon and Sonenberg’s model that forces all known roles in a relationship to
be ﬁlled if any one is occupied. To explain this, consider the previous example relationship between the roles student and
supervisor. If we deﬁne the social commitment between these two roles it captures the general inﬂuence within the rela-
tionship. Thus, if some particular person (or agent) assumes the role of student, he would still be obligated to produce the
thesis to its supervisor even though, at the moment, the school has not appointed a speciﬁc supervisor to him. Therefore,
this subtle yet important extension allows the agents to maintain a social commitment even though the other party of the
relationship is not instantiated. Given this, we can now reﬂect this extension in our notation by stating either the debtor x
or the creditor y in a social commitment denoted as SCx⇒y
θ, f can be either an agent or a role (formally x, y ∈ (R ∪ A) where
R and A denote the set of roles and the set of agents respectively; refer Deﬁnitions 1 and 2).
Another important difference between the model we adopt here and the one proposed by Cavedon and Sonenberg, is
that here we choose to focus on the level of actions and commitments rather at the level of modalities of agents. In more
detail, the work by Cavedon and Sonenberg investigates how different social inﬂuences emanating via roles and relationships
affect the agent’s internal mental states, in particular, the prioritising of goals. However, here we refrain from going into the
level of modalities of agents (such as goals, beliefs, and intentions), but rather stay at the level of actions.4 The motivation
for doing so is twofold. First, our primary interest in this work is to use our model to capture arguments that our agents
can use to argue about their actions in an agent society. We aim to do so by implementing this argumentation system and
testing its performance under various arguing strategies (refer to Section 5). To this end, we believe a model that focuses
on the level of actions, as opposed to goals, beliefs, and intentions, will reduce the complexity of our effort. Second, an
agent adopting a goal, a belief, or an intention can also be perceived as an action that it performs. For instance, when an
agent changes a certain belief it has (i.e., the colour of the sky is not red, but blue), it can be perceived as performing two
actions. First, it performs the action of dropping the existing belief (that the sky is red), and, second, it performs the action
of adopting the new belief (that the sky is blue). Therefore, focusing on the level of actions loses little in terms of generality.
However, we do acknowledge that focusing at this higher level of actions and not in the more deeper level of modalities,
can sometimes limit the level of expressivity of our system. For instance, expressing how social commitments may affect
the internal mental states or the deliberation models of the agents, or modelling agent systems where the internal states of
the agents (and their updates) are not public and cannot be observed at the multi-agent level. Nonetheless, the advantages
that we gain by choosing a model that is easily implementable, we believe, are more important for our work.
4 Readers interested in extended logical formalisms that capture how individual agent’s mental states such as beliefs, desires, goals, and intentions are
affected via different social inﬂuences are referred to [8,49,74].
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multi-agent systems as a schema (refer to Fig. 2). In essence, the social inﬂuence schema captures the summary of the social
reasoning model explained above and forwards it as a schematic natural language representation. Such a representation is
useful to systematically identify and extract arguments and is widely used in argumentation literature [79]. Formulae (1)
through (6) also present a notational representation of this schema.
Deﬁnition 1. For nA,nR ,nP ,nΘ,nSC ∈ N+ , let:
• A = {a1, . . . ,anA } denote a ﬁnite set of agents,• R = {r1, . . . , rnR } denote a ﬁnite set of roles,• P = {p1, . . . , pnP } denote a ﬁnite set of relationships,• SC = {SC1, . . . ,SCnSC } denote a ﬁnite set of social commitments,• Θ = {θ1, . . . , θnΘ } denote a ﬁnite set of actions,•  = { f | f ∈ R,0 f  1} denote the degree of inﬂuence.
Given these, let:
• Act : A × R denote the fact that an agent is acting a role,
• RoleOf : R × P denote the fact that a role is related to a relationship, and
• DebtorOf : (R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the debtor in a social commitment,
• CreditorOf : (R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the creditor in a social commitment,
• ActionOf : Θ × SC denote that an act is associated with a social commitment,
• InﬂuenceOf :  × SC denote the degree of inﬂuence associated with a social commitment, and
• AssocWith : SC × P denote that a social commitment is associated with a relationship.
Having speciﬁed these deﬁnitions, let us consider a relationship p ∈ P that exists between the two roles ri, r j ∈ R and a
social commitment SC ∈ SC that is associated with the relationship p, which commits one of these roles (say ri) to perform
to the other (say r j) an action θ ∈ Θ with a degree of inﬂuence f ∈ . To denote this social commitment more clearly, we
can use our general abbreviated notation SCx⇒y
θ, f . In particular, by stating the debtor x as role ri and the creditor y as role r j ,
we obtain the social commitment SC
ri⇒r j
θ, f .
RoleOf(ri, p) ∧ RoleOf(r j, p) ∧ AssocWith(SC, p) ∧DebtorOf(ri,SC) ∧ CreditorOf(r j,SC)
∧ActionOf(θ,SC) ∧ InﬂuenceOf( f ,SC) ↔ SCri⇒r j
θ, f . (1)
Deﬁnition 2. Let SCx⇒y
θ, f ∈ SC where x, y ∈ (R ∪ A). Thus, as per Castelfranchi [10], SCx⇒yθ, f will result in the debtor attaining
an obligation toward the creditor to perform a stipulated action and the creditor, in turn, attaining the right to inﬂuence
the performance of that action:
SCx⇒y
θ, f → Ox⇒yθ, f − ∧ y⇒xθ, f + , (2)
where:
– Ox⇒y
θ, f − represents the obligation that x attains that subjects it to an inﬂuence of a degree f toward y to perform θ (here
the f − sign indicates the agent being subjected to the inﬂuence) and
– y⇒x
θ, f + represents the right that y attains which gives it the ability to demand, question, and require x regarding the
performance of θ (here the f + sign indicates that the agent attains the right to exert inﬂuence).
Deﬁnition 3. Now let us consider when a particular agent ai ∈ A assumes the debtor role ri in the above social structure.5
This will entail the agent to obtain the social commitment associated with its role:
Act(ai, ri) ∧ SCri⇒r jθ, f → SC
ai⇒r j
θ, f . (3)
Deﬁnition 4. Similarly, if another agent a j ∈ A assumes the creditor role r j , it will also obtain the social commitment
associated with its role:
Act(a j, r j) ∧ SCri⇒r jθ, f → SC
ri⇒a j
θ, f . (4)
5 Here, the term social structure is used to refer to the structure generated by the interlink of different roles and relationships. In the above case, this
would be a simple structure with the two roles ri and r j interlinked via a single relationship p.
N.C. Karunatillake et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 935–981 943Combining (2), and (3) we can state that if an agent acts a certain role in a particular relationship and if there exist a
social commitment that is associated with that relationship that commits its role to act as a debtor, then as a result that
agent attains an obligation towards the corresponding creditor role to perform the related action. Thus, we obtain:
Act(ai, ri) ∧ SCri⇒r jθ, f → O
ai⇒r j
θ, f − . (5)
Similarly, combining (2) and (4) we can state that if an agent acts a certain role in a particular relationship and if there
exists a social commitment that is associated with that relationship that commits its role to act as a creditor, then as a
result that agent attains a right to inﬂuence the corresponding debtor role to perform the related action. Thus, we obtain:
Act(a j, r j) ∧ SCri⇒r jθ, f → 
a j⇒ri
θ, f + . (6)
Having captured the notion of social inﬂuences as a schema, we now explain how agents can use this to systematically
identify and extract the different types of social arguments to use within a multi-agent society.
3.2. The social arguments
When agents operate within a society of incomplete information with diverse and conﬂicting inﬂuences, they may, in
certain instances, lack the knowledge, the motivation, and the capacity to enact all actions associated with their social
commitments. However, to function as a coherent society it is important for these agents to have a means to resolve such
conﬂicts and come to a mutual understanding about their actions. To this end, ABN is argued to provide such a means (see
Section 1). However, to argue in such a society, the agents need to have the capability to ﬁrst identify the arguments to
use. To this end, here we present how agents can use our social inﬂuence schema to systematically identify arguments to
negotiate within a society. We term these social arguments, not only to emphasise their ability to resolve conﬂicts within
a society, but also to highlight the fact that they use the social inﬂuence present within the system as a core means in
changing decisions and outcomes within the society.
More speciﬁcally, we have identiﬁed two major ways in which social inﬂuence can be used to change decisions and
outcomes and thereby resolve conﬂicts between agents. To explain the intuition behind these two ways more clearly, let
us revisit our supervisor-student example. In particular, let us consider a situation where the PhD student Andy has two
socially motivated obligations; one towards his supervisor Ben to write a journal paper and second the towards his project-
manager Cindy to help integrate a certain software component. Now, let us assume that due to time restrictions Andy can
only do one of these, and after considering what he believes to be the inﬂuences of both of these actions choses to integrate
the software. Now, when Ben discovers this decision, he can attempt to follow two main ways to change this decision and
convince/persuade Andy to write the journal paper. The ﬁrst, is to diagnose Andy’s original decision and try to ﬁnd out
if the facts that he used in his reasoning are correct. For instance, due to lack of perfect knowledge of any one of the
premises in the schema (i.e., his role, his correspondent’s role, about the relationship, about the social commitment, about
the degree of inﬂuence etc.), Andy might have made his decision in error. So, one way of changing Andy’s decision would
be to use argumentation dialogue to convince Andy about this incorrect information, correct his beliefs, and request Andy
to consider his decision again with these corrected premises. The second method is to try and negotiate with Andy and,
thereby, try to make writing the journal paper the more favourable option for Andy. In this way, Ben can try to introduce
new parameters into Andy’s decision. For instance, he can explain why having a journal paper would make it easy for him
to defend his thesis, or if he writes the journal paper now the conference paper he is scheduled to write next summer
becomes less important so he might be able to forgo that commitment. In this manner, Ben can use other social inﬂuences
he may have on Andy as leverage to increase the degree of inﬂuence related to this action. If by doing so, Ben can convince
Andy that writing the journal paper is more inﬂuential than participating in the software integration, then Ben can achieve
his objective of changing Andy’s decision. These two methods are depicted in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) respectively. Now, having
explained the basic intuition using our speciﬁc example, next we will capture these in a more general way and, in turn,
systematically use the schema to identify arguments that agents can use in each of these methods.
3.2.1. Socially inﬂuencing decisions
One way to affect an agent’s decisions is by arguing about the validity of that agent’s practical reasoning [4,79]. Simi-
larly, in a social context (as we have explained above), an agent can affect another agent’s decisions by arguing about the
validity of the latter’s social reasoning. In more detail, agents’ decisions to (or not to) perform actions are based on their
internal and/or social inﬂuences. Thus, these inﬂuences formulate the justiﬁcation (or the reason) behind their decisions.
Therefore, agents can affect each other’s decisions indirectly by affecting the social inﬂuences that determine their decisions
(see Fig. 3(a)). Speciﬁcally, in the case of actions motivated via social inﬂuences through the roles and relationships of a
structured society, this justiﬁcation to act (or not to act) ﬂows from the social inﬂuence schema (see Section 3.1). Given this,
we can further classify the ways that agents can socially inﬂuence each other’s decisions into two broad categories:
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(1) Undercut6 the opponent’s existing justiﬁcation to perform (or not) an action by disputing certain premises within the
schema which motivates its opposing decision.
(2) Rebut the opposing decision to act (or not) by,
(a) Pointing out information about an alternative schema that justiﬁes the decision not to act (or act as the case may
be).
(b) Pointing out information about conﬂicts that could or should prevent the opponent from executing its opposing
decision.
Given this, in the following we highlight how agents can systematically use the social inﬂuence schema to identify
these possible types of arguments to socially inﬂuence each other’s decisions (for a formal notation representation of these
arguments expressed using the language deﬁned in Section 3.3.1 refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A).
1. Dispute (Dsp.) existing premises to undercut the opponent’s existing justiﬁcation.
i. Dsp. ai is acting debtor role ri .
ii. Dsp. a j is acting creditor role r j .
iii. Dsp. ri is related to the relationship p.
iv. Dsp. r j is related to the relationship p.
v. Dsp. SC is associated with the relationship p.
vi. Dsp. f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with O.
vii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with O.
viii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with .
2. Point out (P-o) new premises about an alternative schema to rebut the opposing decision.
i. P-o ai is acting the debtor role ri .
ii. P-o a j is acting the creditor role r j .
iii. P-o ri is related to the relationship p.
iv. P-o r j is related to the relationship p.
v. P-o SC is a social commitment associated with the relationship p.
vi. P-o f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with the obligation O.
vii. P-o θ is the action associated with the obligation O.
viii. P-o θ is the action associated with the right .
ix. P-o ai ’s obligation O to perform the action θ .
x. P-o a j ’s right to demand, question and require the action θ .
3. Point out conﬂicts that prevent executing the decision to rebut the opposing decision.
(a) Conﬂicts with respect to O.
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due toward the same role.
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due toward different roles.
(b) Conﬂicts with respect to .
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert inﬂuence upon the same role.
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert inﬂuence upon different roles.
(c) Conﬂicts with respect to θ and another action θ ′ such that (i) θ ′ is an alternative to the same effect as θ ; (ii) θ ′
either hinders, obstructs, or has negative side effects to θ (see [4]).
6 The notion of undercut and rebut we use here is similar to that of [50].
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Agents can also use social inﬂuences within their negotiations. More speciﬁcally, as well as using social argumentation
as a tool to affect decisions (as above), agents can also use negotiation as a tool for “trading social inﬂuences”. In other
words, the social inﬂuences are incorporated as additional parameters of the negotiation object itself [21] (see Fig. 3(b)). For
instance, an agent can promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or many future obligations if the other performs (or
not) a certain action. It can also promise not to (or threaten to) exercise certain rights to inﬂuence one or many existing
obligations if the other performs (or not) a certain action. In this manner, the agents can use their obligations, rights, and
even the relationship itself as parameters in their negotiations. To this end, the following highlights a number of possible
ways that agents can negotiate their social inﬂuences (for a formal notation representation of these arguments expressed
using the language deﬁned in Section 3.3.1 refer to Table A.2 in Appendix A).
4. Use O as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or many future obligations if the other agent performs (or not) a
certain action θ .
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or many existing obligations if the other agent performs (or not) a certain
action θ .
5. Use  as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise not to (or threaten to) exercise the right to inﬂuence one or many existing obligations if the other agent
performs (or not) a certain action θ .
6. Use third party obligations and rights as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Third party obligations
(i) Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or more future obligations toward ak to perform θ ′ , if a j would
(or would not) exercise its right to inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ .
(ii) Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or more existing obligations toward ak to perform θ ′ , if a j would (or
would not) exercise its right to inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ .
ii. Third party rights
(i) Promise to (or threaten not to) exercise the right to inﬂuence one or many existing obligations toward ak to
perform θ ′ , if a j would honour its existing obligation to perform θ .
7. Use P as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Threaten to terminate p (its own relationship with a j) or p′ (a third party relationship that ai has with ak), if the
agent a j performs (or not) a certain action θ .
ii. Threaten to inﬂuence another agent (ak) to terminate its relationship p′′ with a j , if a j performs (or not) a certain
action θ .
In summary, these social arguments allow agents to resolve conﬂicts in two main ways. The ﬁrst set of arguments
facilitate critical discussion about the social inﬂuence schema; thus, these allow the agents to critically question, argue
about, and understand the underlying reasons for each others’ action. This form of engagement not only allows the agents
to extend their incomplete knowledge of the society, but also provides a means to convince their counterparts to change
decisions based on such incomplete information and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts within a society. The second set of arguments
allows the agents to exploit social inﬂuences constructively within their negotiations. Thus, providing agents with additional
parameters to inﬂuence their counterpart to reach agreements and thereby resolve conﬂicts via negotiation.
3.3. The language and protocol
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 formulated a schema that captures the notion of social inﬂuences and, in turn, we systematically
used that schema to identify social arguments that allow agents to resolve conﬂicts within a social context. However,
identifying such arguments is merely the ﬁrst step. Agents also require a means to express such arguments and a mechanism
to govern their interactions that would guide them to resolve their conﬂicts in a multi-agent society. To this end, the
following presents the language and the protocol components deﬁned within our ABN framework.
3.3.1. The language
The language plays an important role in an ABN framework. It not only allows agents to express the content and con-
struct their arguments, but also provides a means to communicate and exchange them within an argumentative dialogue.
Highlighting these two distinct functionalities, we deﬁne the language in our framework at two levels; namely the domain
language and the communication language. The former allows the agents to specify certain premises about their social con-
text and also the conﬂicts that they may face while executing actions within such a context. The latter provides agents with
a means to express these arguments and, thereby, engage in their discourse to resolve conﬂicts. Inspired by the work of
Sierra et al. [69], this two tier deﬁnition not only allows us an elegant way of structuring the language, but also provides a
means to easily reuse the communication component within a different context merely by replacing its domain counterpart.
We now explain each of these in more detail.
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and these ﬂow naturally from our social inﬂuence schema (i.e., Act, RoleOf, DebtorOf, CreditorOf, ActionOf, InﬂuenceOf, and
AssocWith). In addition to these, we deﬁne two additional predicates that provide a means to express the conﬂicts that the
agents may face while executing their actions. Extending the notation detailed in Section 3.1, we can formally deﬁne our
domain language as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. Let the domain language L contain the following predicates:
– Act : A × R denote the fact that an agent is acting a role.
– RoleOf : R × P denote the fact that a role is related to a relationship.
– DebtorOf : (R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or agent) is the debtor in a social commitment.
– CreditorOf : (R ∪ A) × SC denote that a role (or agent) is the creditor in a social commitment.
– ActionOf : Θ × (SC ∪ O ∪ ) denote that an act is associated with a social commitment, obligation, or right.7
– InﬂuenceOf : × (SC∪ O ∪) denote the degree of inﬂuence associated with a social commitment, obligation, or right.
– AssocWith : SC × P denote that a social commitment is associated with a relationship.
– do : A × Θ denote the fact that an agent is performing an action (expressed in the abbreviated form do(θ) when the
agent is unambiguous).
– Conﬂict : do(A × Θ) × do(A × Θ) denote the fact that performing the corresponding actions gives rise to a conﬂict.
In addition to these language predicates, two speciﬁc forms of actions commonly used within this domain are adopting
a new obligation, right, or relationship and terminating (or dropping) an existing one. To denote these speciﬁc actions we
use two special action predicates adopt and drop respectively. Formally,
– adopt(z) ∈ Θ where z ∈ (O ∪  ∪ P ) denotes the action of adopting a new obligation, right, or relationship.
– drop(z) ∈ Θ where z ∈ (O ∪  ∪ P ) denotes the action of terminating an existing obligation, right, or relationship.
Having deﬁned these predicates, we can now give a Backus–Naur Form (BNF) speciﬁcation of the syntax of the domain
language L. Let a ∈ A, r ∈ R , p ∈ P , sc ∈ SC, θ ∈ Θ , o ∈ O , τ ∈ , and f , f ′ ∈ . Given these, a sentence l ∈ L can take the
form,
< sentence> ::= < simple_sentence>|
< action_sentence>|
< conf_sentence>|
¬< sentence>|
< sentence> ∧ < sentence>
< simple_sentence> ::= Act(a, r)|RoleOf(r, p)|AssocWith(sc, p)| f > f ′|
DebtorOf(r, sc)|DebtorOf(a, sc)|
CreditorOf(r, sc)|CreditorOf(a, sc)|
ActionOf(θ, sc)|ActionOf(θ,o)|ActionOf(θ, τ )|
InﬂuenceOf( f , sc)|InﬂuenceOf( f ,o)|InﬂuenceOf( f , τ )|
< action_sentence> ::= do(a, θ)|
do(a,adopt(o))|do(a,adopt(τ ))|do(a,adopt(p))|
do(a,drop(o))|do(a,drop(τ ))|do(a,drop(p))
< conf_sentence> ::= Conﬂict(< action_sentence>,< action_sentence>)
Communication Language: This consists of seven illocutionary particles; namely Open-Dialogue, Propose, Accept, Reject,
Challenge, Assert, and Close-Dialogue. Mainly inspired from the works of Amgoud et al. [2], MacKenzie [42], and McBur-
ney et al. [47], these form the building blocks of our dialogue game protocol explained below (refer to Section 3.3.2). To
7 Note that within our domain language, the two schema predicates ActionOf and InﬂuenceOf are extended to rights and obligations as well as social
commitments. This is to allow agents to directly discuss about the respective parameters such as actions and degrees of inﬂuence related to their individual
obligations and rights, rather than referring to them indirectly via social commitments. Even though this may allow agents to refer to these parameters
in two different ways (i.e., indirectly via social commitments and directly through their obligations and rights), since agents would refer to these quite
regularly when they argue about their social inﬂuences, we believe allowing such a direct method of reference is a useful replication.
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bered L1∼L11) of our communication language as follows.8 Here, ap denotes the proposing agent, ar the responding agent,
and ax1 and ax2 represent either agent:
Deﬁnition 6.
• OPEN-DIALOGUE
◦ Usage:
L1 : Open-Dialogue(ap,ar) or
L2 : Open-Dialogue(ar,ap).
◦ Informal Meaning: Indicates the willingness to engage in the negotiation dialogue. More speciﬁcally, the former is
used by the proposing agent to initiate the dialogue, while the latter is used by the responding agent to express its
willingness to join that dialogue.9
• PROPOSE
◦ Usage:
L3 : Propose(ap,ar,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)).
◦ Informal Meaning: A proposal from ap to ar requesting ar to perform θr and in return for ap performing θp . Thus,
the request of this proposal is do(ar, θr) and the reward is do(ap, θp).
• ACCEPT
◦ Usage:
L4 : Accept(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)).
◦ Informal Meaning: Accept the proposal, thereby agree to perform the requested θr in return for do(ap, θp).
• REJECT
◦ Usage:
L5 : Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)).
◦ Informal Meaning: Reject the request to perform the requested θr in return for do(ap, θp).
• CHALLENGE
◦ Usage:
L6: Challenge(ap,ar,Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)))
L7: Challenge(ax2 ,ax1 ,Assert(ax1 ,ax2 , l)).
◦ Informal Meaning: Challenge the justiﬁcation for a certain premise. In particular, this can challenge:
– the justiﬁcation for a reject, or
– the justiﬁcation for a certain assertion where l denotes the asserted premise which can be a well-formed formula
(wff) of domain language L.
• ASSERT
◦ Usage:
L8: Assert(ax1 ,ax2 , l)
L9: Assert(ax1 ,ax2 ,¬l).
◦ Informal Meaning: Asserts a particular set of premises or their negations. Here, l denotes the asserted premise, which
can be a wff of domain language L. Asserting the negation would account to disputing that premise.
• CLOSE-DIALOGUE
◦ Usage:
L10: Close-Dialogue(ap,ar) or
L11: Close-Dialogue(ar,ap).
◦ Informal Meaning: Indicates the termination of the dialogue. In particular the former is used by the proponent to
indicate terminating the dialogue whereas the latter is used by the respondent to indicate existing the dialogue.10
Both these language components (the domain and the communication) collectively allow the agents to express all the
social arguments identiﬁed in Section 3.2 (i.e., socially inﬂuencing decisions and negotiating social inﬂuences). These are
presented in Appendix A Tables A.1 and A.2 respectively. Given the language element of our ABN framework, we will now
proceed to describe the protocol.
8 Here, we only specify the usage and informal meaning for each of the predicates in our communication language. Due to space restrictions, the detailed
formal semantics of the language are presented as a separate technical report [36].
9 Please note that even though the two locutions L1 and L2 have a similar syntax, they have different usage, pre-conditions, and effects. These distinctions
are highlighted by the axiomatic semantics (refer to [36]) and the operational semantics (refer to Appendix B).
10 Note that, similar to Open-Dialogue locution, locutions L10 and L11 also have different usage, pre-conditions, and effects. These distinctions are high-
lighted by the axiomatic semantics (refer to [36]) and the operational semantics (refer to Appendix B).
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3.3.2. The protocol
In essence, the protocol governs the agents’ interactions and acts as a guidance for them to resolve their conﬂicts. While
the overall structure of our protocol is inspired from the work on computational conﬂicts by Tessier et al. [73], the works
on pragma-dialectics proposed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst [77], and that on dialogue games conducted by McBurney
et al. [46,47], and Amgoud et al. [2] contributed greatly in deﬁning its operational guidelines.
In overview, our protocol consists of six main stages: (i) opening, (ii) conﬂict recognition, (iii) conﬂict diagnosis, (iv) conﬂict
management, (v) agreement, and (vi) closing. The opening and closing stages provide the important synchronisation points
for the agents involved in the dialogue, the former indicating its commencement and the latter its termination [47]. The four
remaining stages allow agents to recognise, diagnose, and manage their conﬂicts. In more detail, in the conﬂict recognition
stage, the initial interaction between the agents brings the conﬂict to the surface. Subsequently, the diagnosis stage allows
the agents to establish the root cause of the conﬂict and also decide on how to address it (i.e., whether to avoid the conﬂict
or attempt to manage and resolve it through argumentation and negotiation [35]). Next, the conﬂict management stage
allows the agents to argue and negotiate, thus, addressing the cause of this conﬂict. Finally, the agreement stage brings the
argument to an end, either with the participants agreeing on a mutually acceptable solution or agreeing to disagree due
to the lack of such a solution. These four stages for arguing to resolve conﬂicts in a social context map seamlessly to the
four stages in the pragma-dialectics model for critical discussion proposed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst [77]; namely
confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding respectively.
In operation, our protocol follows the tradition of dialogue games [46,47] where a dialogue is perceived as a game in
which each participant make moves (termed dialogue moves) to win or tilt the favour of the game toward itself. Here,
the protocol deﬁnes the different rules for the game such as locution rules (indicating the moves that are permitted),
commitment rules (deﬁning the commitments each participant incurs with each move), and structural rules (that deﬁne the
types of moves available following the previous move).11
Against this background, here, the objective of our protocol is to govern the pair-wise interactions between the agents
(those that assume the debtor and creditor roles within a society), guiding the two parties to resolve conﬂicts related to
their social inﬂuences. The two parties within the dialogue are referred to as the proponent (the one who initiates the
dialogue) and the respondent (the one who responds). The proponent can be either the debtor or creditor agent, while the
respondent will be the corresponding other (i.e., in case debtor initiates, the creditor will act as the respondent).
Fig. 4 presents an abstract view of our protocol.12 Here, the nodes of the graph represent the various communication
predicates allowed in our ABN protocol while the edges denote the legal transitions permitted between these distinct
dialogue moves. For instance, consider the Reject locution in Fig. 4. An agent can choose to reject a proposal only after its
counterpart has forwarded that proposal. Thus, a Reject dialogue move becomes valid only after a Propose locution, which
is deﬁned as a pre-condition for this locution. On the other hand, if its proposal is rejected, the proponent can respond
in one of three possible ways. It may either forward an alternative proposal, try to ﬁnd the reason for this rejection by
challenging this decision, or end the negotiation dialogue. These three possibilities are represented in Fig. 4 by allowing
agents to utter either a Propose, Challenge, or Close-Dialogue move after a Reject.
11 Note, this is not intended to be an exhaustive list of rules, but rather the most important ones in our context. For instance, if the aim of the dialogue
governed by the protocol is persuasion, the win-loss rules specifying what counts as a winning or losing position would become a vital component. For a
more detailed discussion refer to [46].
12 Note that this diagram only presents an overall abstract view of the protocol. As explained later, detailed axioms of the protocol are given in [36] and
its operational semantics are deﬁned in Appendix B.
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we specify the purpose of that dialogue move, its structural rules by way of pre- and post-condition utterances, and any
effects it may have on both the commitment (CS) and the information stores (IS) of the related agents.13 The following
speciﬁes these detailed axiomatic rules for the Reject locution.
REJECT (Locution L5): If the received proposal failed to satisfy the respondent’s acceptance conditions, it will retort back
with a rejection. In effect both agents would record a dialogical commitment to the fact that the respondent rejected
the proposal.
– Usage:
• L5 : Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)).
– Meaning: By uttering the locution “Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp))”, agent ar indicates to agent ap that ar rejects
the proposal made by ap in a prior utterance of the locution “Propose(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp))”.
– Pre-conditions:
• For Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp))
Propose(ap,ar,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)) ∈ CSi−1(ar).
– Valid Responses:
• For Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θpi )):
Propose(ap,ar,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp(i+1) ))
Challenge(Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θpi )))
Close-Dialogue(ap,ar).
– IS (information store) updates: none
– CS (commitment store) updates:
• CSi(ap) ← CSi−1(ap) ∪ Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp))
• CSi(ar) ← CSi−1(ar) ∪ Reject(ar,ap,do(ar, θr),do(ap, θp)).
Due to space restrictions, we present the full axiomatic rules governing each language element in our protocol as a sepa-
rate technical report. Thus, a reader interested in the comprehensive axiomatic rules of the protocol is referred to [36]. Now,
having explained our ABN protocol, we next proceed to detail the ﬁnal component of our ABN framework; the individual
decision functions.
3.4. The decision functions
The protocol described in the previous sub-section gives agents a number of different options, at various stages, as to
what utterances to make. For instance, after a proposal the receiving agent could either accept or reject it. After a rejection,
the agent may choose to challenge this rejection, end the dialogue, or forward an alternative proposal. An agent, therefore,
still requires a mechanism for selecting a particular utterance among the available legal options. To this end, in the following
we deﬁne the various decision mechanisms required by both the proponent and the respondent agent to use the deﬁned
protocol to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent society. Here, the term proponent is used
to specify the agent that attempts to negotiate the services14 of another to accomplish one of its actions. The respondent,
on the other hand, denotes its counterpart participating this negotiation.
In specifying these mechanisms, we use a representation similar to that of McBurney et al. [47], which investigates the
use of dialogue game protocols for modelling consumer purchase negotiations. It allows a coherent way of modelling the
decision functions in line with the protocol, which, in turn, help us deﬁne the operational semantics (refer to Appendix B)
of the protocol in a systematic manner. In this context, we use the same style to deﬁne the decision functions (and later
the operational semantics; see Appendix B) required by individual agents to use ABN to resolve conﬂicts within the social
context of a multi-agent system.
3.4.1. Decision mechanisms for the proponent
In essence, the proponent’s decision model has 11 basic decision mechanisms (numbered P1∼P11). These collectively
allow the proponents to use the above protocol to argue, negotiate, resolve any conﬂicts, and, thereby, acquire the services
of their counterparts to achieve actions.
P1 Recognise Need: A mechanism that allows the agent to decide whether it requires the services of another to achieve a
certain action (θ). This will have two possible outcomes. In case the mechanism recognises that it needs to acquire the
services of another agent, it will forward the outcome needService(θ). Otherwise, it will forward noNeedService(θ).
13 Agents participating in dialogue games would establish and maintain their individual commitment (CS) and information stores (IS) to record both the
dialogical and action commitments incurred (refer to [80]), as well as any knowledge (or information) gained during the dialogue. Agent’s knowledge-base
would include both commitments and information gained and stored in these CS and IS during their interaction, as well as any other information the agent
may possess about its context.
14 Here, the term service refers to an action or sequence of actions performed by one agent at the request of another.
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2: θp ← getNext(Θ)
3: while (θp = ∅) do
4: if (Capable(do(ap, θp)) ∧ Bapdo(ar ,θr ) > C
ap
do(ap ,θp )
) then
5: Q (θ) ← Q (θ) ∪ Propose(ap,ar ,do(ar , θr),do(ap, θp))
6: end if
7: θp ← getNext(Θ)
8: end while
9: return Q (θ)
Algorithm 1. Decision algorithm for generating proposals.
P2 Generate Proposals: A mechanism that allows the proponent to generate proposals in order to negotiate the required
service from its counterpart. In generating such proposals, each proponent would take two rationality conditions into
consideration; namely (i) the feasibility of the proposal and (ii) its viability.15 In more detail, given that we assume our
agents do not intentionally attempt to deceive one another, the proponent must have the capability to perform the
reward suggested in each proposal. Thus, they will only generate proposals that they believe they have the capability
to honour. Furthermore, given that our agents are self-interested, each proposal that they generate also needs to be
viable on their behalf. Thus, the cost incurred by the proponent in performing the reward (for the generic proposal
Propose(ap,ar ,do(ar , θr),do(ap, θp)) this is denoted as C
ap
do(ap ,θp )
) should not exceed the beneﬁt it gains from its respondent
performing the requested action (denoted as Bapdo(ar ,θr )). This is highlighted in Algorithm 1.
16 The outcome of this decision
mechanism would be a non-empty set of proposals with the required action θ as the request and an array of both
feasible and viable rewards. We denote this unordered non-empty ﬁnite set as Q (θ).
P3 Rank Proposals: A mechanism that allows the proponent to rank its generated set of proposals. In more detail, the
agent would use the cost of performing the reward (Capdo(ap ,θp )) as the ranking parameter. More speciﬁcally, a proposal
that contains a reward that costs less to perform will rank higher than one that costs more. Thus, the outcome of this
mechanism is an ordered list of proposals denoted as:
S(θ) = {S0(θ), S1(θ), . . . , Si(θ), . . . , St(θ)
}
where cost
(
Si(θ)
)
< cost
(
Si+1(θ)
); t ∈ N.
P4 Select Proposal: A mechanism that allows the agent to select a proposal to forward to its counterpart. Generally, the
agent will take the next highest ranked proposal from its ordered proposal list S(θ). If there is no such proposal (the
ﬁnal possible proposal has already been sent) the mechanism will return ∅, in which case the agent will proceed to
terminate the dialogue. Thus, there are two possible outcomes. If there is a proposal to forward next, then it will return
that proposal Si(θ). Otherwise the decision mechanism will return ∅.
P5 Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate: If a certain proposal is rejected, the proponent needs to decide
whether to ﬁnd the justiﬁcation for that rejection, continue negotiation with an alternative proposal, or terminate its
negotiation. This is a tactical choice for the agent and the decision criteria will depend on its argumentation strat-
egy. Corresponding to these three options, this mechanism has three possible outcomes; (i) challengeReject(Si(θ)), (ii)
continue(Si(θ)), or terminate(Si(θ)).
P6 Evaluate Justiﬁcations: A mechanism that allows an agent to compare its own justiﬁcation (Hp) with its counter-
part’s (Hr) and analyse any inconsistencies between them. A number of different approaches can be used to design
this mechanism ranging from a simple arbitration heuristic to a more complicated defeasible system that is based on
the strength of justiﬁcation or even a repeated learning heuristic. In our implementation, we use a simple validation
heuristic that has the ability to identify the accuracy of these justiﬁcations by examining the validity of each of their
respective premises (for a more detailed description of this implementation refer to Algorithm 4 in Section 5.1). Irre-
spective of how this is implemented, in essence, the decision mechanism will have three possible outcomes. First, if the
mechanism ﬁnds all premises within a certain justiﬁcation (either the proponent’s or the respondent’s) to be valid, then
it will indicate this through the valid(H) outcome where H = {Hp, Hr}. Second, if it ﬁnds a certain premise l (where
l ∈ H) in either the proponent’s or the respondent’s justiﬁcation to be invalid, it will then indicate this via the invalid(l)
outcome. Third, if the mechanism requires more information to accurately identify whether a certain premise is valid or
invalid, then it will indicate this via the outcome needMoreJustiﬁcation(l).
P7 Extract Justiﬁcation: A mechanism that allows an agent to search within its own knowledge-base to extract jus-
tiﬁcations for certain premises. Even though our framework has two speciﬁc types of challenges, L6 and L7 (see
15 This work assumes the agents are self-interested in nature and do not actively attempt to deceive one another. Under these assumptions, we believe,
the viability and feasibility are the two most important factors to consider. However, they do not represent the only two factors. For instance, when
agents generate proposals, issues such as trust and reputation of their counterpart may also be important, especially in open multi-agent systems [30]. By
incorporating such elements into the decision criteria of the above algorithm, our model can be easily extended to accommodate these different issues.
Nevertheless, such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
16 Here, we deﬁne these algorithms at an abstract level that is independent of any domain. However, by deﬁning how the agents can evaluate these costs,
beneﬁts, and feasibility conditions these can be set to reﬂect a particular context. To aid understanding, Section 4.4 presents one such mapping within our
experimental context.
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ar
do(ar ,θr )
) then
2: Accept(ar ,ap,do(ar , θr),do(ap, θp))
3: else
4: Reject(ar ,ap,do(ar , θr),do(ap, θp))
5: end if
Algorithm 2. Decision algorithm for evaluating proposals.
Section 3.3.2), only L7 is applicable to the proponent. Reasoning about challenges of type of L6 (i.e., challenge to estab-
lish the reason for rejection) is only applicable to the responding agent. In case where the challenge is of type L7 (i.e.,
challenge to establish the justiﬁcation for a particular assertion), the mechanism will forward the reason behind the
corresponding assertion. Thus, this will return a single outcome H as justiﬁcation.
P8 Update Knowledge: A mechanism that allows an agent to update its knowledge with a certain fact. It will trigger a
single outcome knowledgeUpdate(l) where l represents the updated fact.
P9 Consider Counter Argument: A mechanism that allows an agent to search within its knowledge to ﬁnd a valid counter
argument. This has two possible outcomes. First, if the mechanism ﬁnds a counter argument H ′ it will indicate this via
hasCounterArg(H ′). Alternatively, if it doesn’t, it will indicate this via noCounterArg().
P10 Terminate Challenge: A mechanism that allows an agent to terminate the current challenge. Once complete, it will
generate a single possible outcome evaluationComplete() indicating this termination.
P11 Terminate Interaction: A mechanism that allows the agent to terminate the interaction through exiting the dialogue.
Here, the single outcome is exitDialogue(θ) where θ represents the corresponding action under negotiation.
3.4.2. Decision mechanisms for the respondent
The corresponding respondent’s decision model has six basic decision mechanisms (R1∼R6). Collectively, they allow the
agents to participate as a respondent within our ABN protocol and, thereby, resolve conﬂicts.
R1 Consider Participation: A mechanism that allows the agent to consider whether to participate in the negotiation in-
teraction. Here, we assume that all agents are willing to participate. Thus, this mechanism will lead a single outcome
enterDialogue(θ) where θ represents the corresponding action under negotiation.17
R2 Evaluate Proposal: A mechanism that allows the respondent agent to evaluate a proposal forwarded by its counterpart.
Similar to when generating a proposal, the respondent agent will need to consider two analogous rationality conditions
for evaluating proposals; namely (i) the feasibility of the proposal and (ii) its viability. More speciﬁcally, (i) the respon-
dent ar needs to have the capability to perform the requested action and (ii) the beneﬁt of the suggested reward for
the responding agent (denoted as Bardo(ap ,θp)) should outweigh the cost of performing the requested action (denoted as
Cardo(ar ,θr )). If both these conditions are satisﬁed the agent will accept the proposal, otherwise it will reject it. Thus, the
mechanism has two possible outcomes accept(Si(θ)) or reject(Si(θ)).
R3 Extract Justiﬁcation: A mechanism that allows the respondent agent to search within its own knowledge-base and
extract the justiﬁcation for a certain premise. This is similar to the P7 decision mechanism of the proponent. However,
unlike the above, a respondent can receive both (L6 and L7) types of challenges. Thus, the justiﬁcation would depend
on the type of the challenge. More speciﬁcally, if the challenge is of type L6 (i.e., challenge to establish the reason for
rejection) then the outcome would be the reason for rejecting that proposal. On the other hand, if the challenge is of
type L7 (i.e., challenge to establish the justiﬁcation for a particular assertion), then the reason behind this assertion
is forwarded as the justiﬁcation. In both cases, the mechanism will return a single outcome H as the corresponding
justiﬁcation.
R4 Consider Premise: A mechanism that allows the agent to consider a particular premise with its current knowledge. This
has two possible outcomes. If the agent believes it needs further justiﬁcation to accept this premise (l) it will indicate
this via the needMoreJustiﬁcation(l) outcome. Alternatively, if the agent chooses to accept this premise, it will update its
knowledge with this premise and will generate a knowledgeUpdate(l) outcome.
R5 Consider Counter Argument: A mechanism that allows an agent to search within its knowledge to ﬁnd a valid counter
argument. This is similar to the proponent’s P9 decision mechanism and analogously has two possible outcomes. First,
if the mechanism ﬁnds a counter argument H ′ it will indicate this via hasCounterArg(H ′). Alternatively, if it doesn’t, it
will indicate this via noCounterArg().
R6 Terminate Interaction: A mechanism that allows the respondent to react to a dialogue termination initiated by the
proponent. Similarly, here the single outcome is exitDialogue(θ) where θ represents the corresponding action under
negotiation.
17 As explained in Section 3.4.1, all these decision mechanisms assume the agents are self-interested. Therefore, all the service providers aim to maximise
their earnings. To this end, even if respondents are already committed to a particular action, they are always willing to listen to other proposals, since
they have the ability to de-commit if they perceive a more proﬁtable opportunity. Due to this reason, we assume that all responding agents are willing to
participate in all dialogues.
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and the rules of encounter speciﬁed by the protocol (refer to Section 3.3.2 and [36]) all combine together to allow our
framework to function as a coherent computing system, which allows agents carry out argumentative dialogues to resolve
conﬂicts. We can formally specify the interaction of these three elements as operational semantics [19,54]. First introduced
by van Eijk in [19], operational semantics have now become a widely accepted method of formalising complex dialogue
systems. In particular, the semantics specify the agents utterances and their individual decision-mechanisms as state transi-
tion operators, and, thereby, precisely deﬁne the interaction between the proponent and the respondent as a state transition
system. We present this detailed semantics in Appendix B, and next use an illustrative dialogue to highlight how these dif-
ferent elements combine together to allow our agents Ben (the supervisor) and Andy (the student) to form an argumentative
dialogue within our supervisor-student example.
3.5. Illustrative dialogue
As introduced in Section 1, here we consider a conﬂict between two agents; Andy (ar), an agent acting the role of a PhD
student (rp), and Ben (ap), acting as his supervisor (rs). In this context, we assume that Andy has obligations to perform
two distinct actions, both toward Ben: (i) to write a conference paper (θc) and (ii) to write a journal paper (θ j). However,
due to time restrictions, Andy can only do one of these actions and has decided to do θc at the expense of θ j . However, this
choice is in conﬂict with Ben’s own motivation to submit the journal paper in time for an important deadline.
In this context, the sample dialogue presented in Table 1 illustrates a particular way Ben can argue, negotiate and,
thereby, inﬂuence Andy to change his decision. In more detail, ﬁrst, Table 1 presents the sample dialogue using natural
language. Here, Ben acts as the proponent of the dialogue and Andy as the respondent. This natural language representation
highlights how this dialogue systematically ﬂows through each of the ﬁve main stages of our protocol. More speciﬁcally, it
demonstrates how the two participants open the dialogue, how their interaction allows them to recognise the presence of a
conﬂict, how proponent Ben attempts to diagnose the underlying reason for the conﬂict, and how they manage it and reach
an agreement by using an ABN dialogue.
Table 1 also shows how agents can use the different locutions within our ABN framework to encode each of these
dialogue moves. In addition, it also presents the detailed transition steps (speciﬁed in Appendix B) taken by each individual
agent to automatically generate the different locutions of this dialogue. These transitions combine the agent utterances
(both by the proponent and respondent) and their individual decision mechanisms (highlighted in Section 3.4) and, thereby,
specify how the ABN system operates to allow the autonomous agents to engage this bilateral dialogue. For instance, to
generate the ﬁrst Open-Dialogue move M1, the proponent agent would use the transition TR2 (refer to Appendix B). This
is speciﬁed as; [ap,P1,needService(θ)] L1−→[ar,R1, .]. This means that the proponent (Ben) would ﬁrst use the P1: Recognise
Need decision mechanism to consider if it requires the services of another (Andy) to achieve the action of writing the journal
paper. Once he realise he does indeed need the services of Andy, he would, in turn, initiate a dialogue with Andy through
the L1: Open-Dialogue locution. When Andy receives this L1 locution, it will, in turn, initiate his R1: Consider Participation
decision mechanism. Thereafter the system would move to the TR3 transition where the respondent Andy considers his
participation and would respond back with a L2: Open-Dialogue locution conﬁrming his willingness to participate in the
dialogue. This appears as the next move M2 of the dialogue. In this manner, Table 1 presents the full sequence of transitions,
which guides the agents through the series of decision mechanisms and utterances required to generate and progress
through the sample dialogue within our ABN framework.
Given the detailed theoretical deﬁnition of our ABN framework, next we map this theory into a computational argumen-
tation context in order to empirically justify the performance beneﬁts of our argumentation framework in resolving conﬂicts
in agent societies.
4. The experimental argumentation context
To evaluate how agents can use our argumentation model to manage and resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent society, we
require a computational context in which a number of agents interact in the presence of social inﬂuences and conﬂicts arise
as a natural consequence of these interactions. To this end, we now detail how we map our general ABN framework into
a speciﬁc multi-agent task allocation scenario.18 In particular, Section 4.1 gives an overview of the task environment of our
scenario followed by Section 4.2 that details its social context. Subsequently, in Section 4.3 we explain how conﬂicts arise
within this context. Given this, ﬁnally, Section 4.4 details how agents can use our ABN model to interact and manage such
conﬂicts within it.
18 The task/resource allocation problem is one of the most commonly found in distributed computing. For instance, many real world computing envi-
ronments such as the grid [23], service-oriented systems [71], sensor networks [43], and supply chain management systems [68] all have this as one of
their central issues. Thus, in choosing this scenario we aim to illustrate how ABN can be useful and versatile in handling such a fundamental issue. Here,
we deﬁne the task allocation problem in its most basic form. In so doing, we abstract away any speciﬁc issue related to a particular context and, thereby,
keep the scenario computationally simple for experimental analysis. We encourage future experimental effort within this domain to explore the value of
argumentation and how it can be usefully applied in different domains and conditions.
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Leading to the Locution Stages
Opening
→ TR7 Conﬂict
Recognition
Conﬂict
Diagnosis
Conﬂict
Management
26
24 → TR27 → TR29 → TR11 → TR7
28
11 → TR7
Agreement
ClosingTable 1
A sample dialogue.
Dialogue Move Natural Language Representation Notational Representation Transitions
M1: Ben Open-Dialogue Open-Dialogue(ap ,ar) TR2
M2: Andy Open-Dialogue Open-Dialogue(ar ,ap) TR3
M3: Ben I propose you write the journal paper Propose(ap ,ar ,do(ar , θ j),∅) TR4 → TR5
M4: Andy No, I can’t. Reject(ar ,ap ,do(ar , θ j),∅) TR9
M5: Ben Why not? Challenge(ap ,ar ,Reject(ar ,ap ,do(ar , θ j),∅)) TR12
M6: Andy I am scheduled to write a conference paper and it
conﬂicts with writing the journal paper since I
can’t do two things at once.
Assert(ar ,ap ,Conﬂict(do(ar , θt ),do(ar , θ j))) TR13
M7: Ben But, you have an obligation towards your
supervisor to write this journal paper and I am
your supervisor
Assert(ap ,ar ,O
ar⇒rs
θ j
∧ Act(ap , rs)) TR19
M8: Andy I also have an obligation towards my supervisor to
write this conference paper.
Assert(ar ,ap ,O
ar⇒rs
θc
) TR23 → TR
M9: Ben I propose that you write the journal paper and
not write the conference paper
Propose(ap ,ar ,do(ar , θ j) ∧ ¬do(ar , θc),∅) TR17 → TR
M10: Andy No, I can’t Reject(ap ,ar ,do(ar , θ j) ∧ ¬do(ar , θc),∅) TR9
M11: Ben Why not? Challenge(ap ,ar ,Reject(ap ,ar ,do(ar , θ j)
∧¬do(ar , θc),∅))
TR12
M12: Andy The obligation to write the conference paper
inﬂuences me more than the journal paper
Assert(ar ,ap , InﬂuenceOf( fc,O
ar⇒rs
θc
)∧
InﬂuenceOf( f j ,O
ar⇒rs
θ j
)∧ fc > f j)
TR13
M13: Ben I disagree. You have misunderstood. The journal
paper should inﬂuence you more than the
conference paper and I am your supervisor.
Assert(ap ,ar ,¬( fc > f j) ∧ ( f j > fc)∧
Act(ap , rs)
TR18
M14: Andy OK. The inﬂuence to write the journal paper is
more important than the conference paper.
Assert(ar ,ap , ( f j > fc)) TR23 → TR
M15: Ben Now, I propose that you write the journal paper
and not write the conference paper.
Propose(ap ,ar ,do(ar , θ j) ∧ ¬do(ar , θi),∅) TR29 → TR
M16: Andy I accept. Accept(ar ,ap ,do(ar , θ j) ∧ ¬do(ar , θi),∅) TR8
M17: Ben Close-Dialogue Close-Dialogue(ap,ar) TR30
M18: Andy Close-Dialogue Close-Dialogue(ar ,ap) TR31
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A sample multi-agent task scenario.
Time a0 a1 a2
c(0,0.8), c(1,0.1) c(0,0.1), c(1,0.7) c(0,0.4), c(1,0.5)
t0 θ0 : [t0, c(0,0.5),200] θ0 : [t0, c(1,0.2),500] θ0 : [t0, c(1,0.5),700]
t1 θ1 : [t1, c(1,0.3),900] θ1 : [t1, c(0,0.4),300] θ1 : [t1, c(1,0.7),100]
t2 θ2 : [t2, c(1,0.1),400] θ2 : [t2, c(0,0.8),900]
t3 θ3 : [t3, c(0,0.9),600]
4.1. The task environment
The task environment consists of two main elements. On one hand, each agent in the system has a list of actions that
it is required to achieve. On the other hand, all agents in the system have different capabilities to perform these actions. In
this context, agents are allowed to interact and negotiate between one another to ﬁnd capable counterparts that are willing
to sell their services to perform their actions. The following speciﬁes these main elements in more detail:
Capability: All agents within the domain have an array of capabilities. Each such capability has two parameters: (i) a type
value (x) deﬁning the type of that capability and (ii) a capability level (d ∈ [0,1]) deﬁning the agent’s competence level in
that capability (1 indicates total competence, 0 no competence). Given this, we denote a capability as c(x,d) : [x,d].
Action: Each action has four main parameters: (i) the speciﬁed time (ti) that the action needs to be performed where i ∈ N,
(ii) the capability type (x) required to perform it, (iii) the minimum capability level (d′) required to successfully complete
the action, and (iv) the reward (r; distributed normally19 with a mean μ and a standard deviation σ) that the agent would
gain if the action is completed. Given this, we denote an action as θi : [ti, c(x,d′), r].
Each agent within the context is seeded with a speciﬁed number of such actions. This number varies randomly between
agents within a pre-speciﬁed range. Table 2 depicts one such sample scenario for a three agent context (a0, a1, and a2) with
their respective capabilities and actions. For instance, agent a0 has two capability types; c0 with a competence level of 0.8
and c1 with a level of 0.1. It also has four actions; θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3; each with their respective capability types, minimum levels,
and rewards.
In this scenario, the main objective of the agents is to maximise their individual earnings. There are two methods of
doing so. First, they can ﬁnd willing and capable counterparts to complete their assigned actions. Once an agent manages
to complete a certain action, it will receive the reward associated with that action less any service payments made to
acquire the services of its counterpart. This we term the agent’s task earnings. Second, agents can sell their services to other
agents and gain a payment. This we term the agent’s service earnings. Both these components contribute toward the overall
individual earnings of the agent. However, since agents pay for the services of one another, for each service payment an
agent makes there would be another corresponding agent obtaining a service earning. Thus, when considering the whole
agent population the service earnings and service payments will cancel each other out and the total population earnings of
the society will account for the cumulative reward values of the actions achieved by all agents within the society.
One important characteristic within this domain is the agents’ ability to renege on agreements after paying a suﬃcient
de-commitment charge. In more detail, since we assume that agents can only perform a single action at any one time, if a
certain agent (in the above example a1 in Table 2) agrees to provide its services to a speciﬁc agent (a2) for a particular time
slot (t1), a1 will not be able to agree to perform any other action at t1, unless it cancels its current agreement with a2. For
example, if a0 requests a1 to perform its action, which requires capability c1 at t1, it cannot do so unless it reneges on its
current contract with a2. In this context, we allow agents to renege upon their agreements if they perceive a more proﬁtable
opportunity. This ability to renege is important because it promotes opportunities for the agents that seek services later
in the scheduling process to achieve agreements if they are willing to pay suﬃciently high premiums for these services.
Therefore, a1 has the potential to pay a certain compensation value to a2 and de-commit itself out of its current agreement
and render its services to another agent (for instance a0), if it receives a more proﬁtable offer from the latter (a0). Here, we
use a simple heuristic to calculate this compensation value. In particular, it is evaluated as the original agreed price plus a
ﬁxed percentage (10%) of that price as de-commitment penalty (for more details refer to [34]).20
19 Here, we use a normal distribution since it gives a more realistic representation of the type of tasks found in many real world applications (i.e., high
number of medium rewarding tasks and a low number of very high and very low rewarding tasks). However, we do not believe this choice of distribution
is not critical to this work.
20 Here, any amount lost or gained due to de-commitment penalties are deemed to be embodied within the rewards and the service earning values and
such payments cancel out one another when we consider the whole society.
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r0 0 1 0
r1 1 0 1
r2 0 1 0
r0 r1 r2
r0 [0:0] [200:0] [0:0]
r1 [400:100] [0:0] [200:600]
r2 [0:0] [700:200] [0:0]
r0 r1 r2
a0 1 0 0
a1 0 1 1
a2 0 1 0
(a) Rol-Rel mapping. (b) Social commitment mapping. (c) Ag-Rol mapping.
Fig. 5. Social inﬂuence model.
4.2. The social context
Given the task environment of our argumentation scenario, we now describe its social context. In essence, here we
embody a rich social structure into our multi-agent system. In particular, this structure encapsulates a set of roles intercon-
nected via a series of relationships. When agents assume these roles, they will automatically be part of these relationships
with other agents within the society. This social structure will, in turn, exert social inﬂuences upon the agents when they
interact within the society. The following explains how to model these in more detail.
As the ﬁrst step in mapping this social context into our computational context, we deﬁne a speciﬁc number of roles
and randomly link them to create a web of relationships. This deﬁnes the role-relationship structure. In our experiments
we represent this via a single matrix. Fig. 5(a) shows an example of such a representation between 3 roles: r1, r2, and r3,
where 1 indicates that a relationship exists between the two related roles, and 0 indicates no relationship. For instance,
consider the three values 0, 1, 0 in ﬁrst row in the Table 5(a). Since a relationship requires the interlink of two different
roles, the ﬁrst zero indicates the absence of relationship between the same role r0. Thus, the diagonal of this matrix will
always be zeros. On the other hand, the second value 1 indicates presence of a relationship between the roles ro and r1
while the third value 0 indicates that a relationship does not exist between the roles ro and r2. Since a relationship between
ro and r1 essentially means that there exists a relationship between r1 and r0, this matrix will always be symmetrical. For
example, when we say a relationship exists between the student and supervisor roles, the same relationship also exists
between supervisor and student.
Given this role-relationship structure, we now randomly specify social commitments for each of the active relationship
edges (those that are deﬁned as 1 in the mapping). As per Section 3.1, a social commitment in our context is a commitment
by one role, to another, to provide a certain type of capability when requested. An important component of our notion of
social commitment is that not all of them inﬂuence the agents in a similar manner and they each have their associated
degree of inﬂuence (refer to Section 3.1). Here, we map these different degrees of inﬂuence by associating each social
commitment with a de-commitment penalty. Thus, any agent may violate a certain social commitment at any given time.
However, it will be liable to pay the speciﬁed de-commitment value for this violation (this is similar to the notion of
levelled commitments introduced by Sandholm and Lesser [67]). Since all our agents are self-interested, they prefer not to
lose rewards in the form of penalties, so a higher de-commitment penalty yields a stronger social commitment (thereby,
reﬂecting a higher social inﬂuence). Given this, Fig. 5(b) represents such a mapping corresponding to the social structure
represented in Fig. 5(a). For instance, consider the relationship that exist between roles r0 and r1 (due to the 1 in row
1 column 2 in Fig. 5(a), or row 2 column 1 due to its symmetrical nature). Now, as a result, we can randomly generate
de-commitment values for each capability type in Fig. 5(b). Note that, the columns in Fig. 5(b) represent the debtor roles
and the rows the creditor roles. Thus, the entry [400:100] in row 2, column 1 indicates that the debtor role r0 is committed
to provide capabilities c0 and c1 to a holder of the creditor role r1. If the agent holding the role r0 chooses not to honour
these commitments it will have to pay 400 and 100 (respectively for c0 and c1) if asked. On the other hand, the entry
[200:0] in row 1, column 2 indicates that the debtor role r1 is committed to provide capabilities c0 and c1 to a holder of
the creditor role r0 denoting the different social commitments indebted by the role r1 towards the role r0. This is because,
for example, the social commitments from the role student towards supervisor will be different to those from supervisor
to student. Therefore, the social commitment matrix is not symmetric allowing us to capture the non-symmetric nature
of social commitment between the opposite directions within a given relationship. Finally, if a relationship does not exist
between any two roles (i.e., between roles r0 and r2; note the 0 in row 1 column 3 in Fig. 5(a)) social commitments would
not exist between such roles. So these would have zero values in their corresponding entries in Fig. 5(b) (i.e., note the [0:0]
in row 1 column 3 in Fig. 5(b)).
Having designed this social structure and the associated social commitments, ﬁnally we assign these roles to the actual
agents operating within our system as shown in Fig. 5(c). For instance, the 1, 0, 0 in the ﬁrst row in Fig. 5(c) indicates that
the agent a0 assumes the role r0, but does not assume r1 and r2. The next row 0, 1, 1 indicates that the next agent a1
assumes the roles r1 and r2, but not r0.
From these three representations, we can easily extract the rights and the obligations of each individual agent within our
system. For instance, the agent-role mapping (see Fig. 5(c)) shows that agent a0 acts the role r0. Given this, a0’s obligations
and rights can be extracted by following the column and row corresponding that role in Fig. 5(b). In more detail, by
following the column 1 corresponding to r0 in Fig. 5(b) (i.e., [0:0], [400:100], [0:0]) we can extract the obligations of the
role and by following row 1 in Fig. 5(b) (i.e., [0:0], [200:0], [0:0]) we can extract its rights. Since agent a0 assumes this role
r0, the agent will obtain these obligations and rights as its own. If an agent assumes more than one role (such as agent
a1 that assumes roles r1 and r2) it will obtain the obligations and rights of all its roles. As an example, the following lists
obligations and rights of the agent a0:
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– to provide c0 to an agent acting r1; obliged to pay 400 if de-committed.
– to provide c1 to an agent acting r1; obliged to pay 100 if de-committed.
• Rights:
– to demand c0 from an agent acting r1 or to demand 200 if de-committed.
Given this global representation of social inﬂuence, we will now detail how we seed individual agents with this infor-
mation. Since one of the aims in our experiments is to test how agents use argumentation to manage and resolve conﬂicts
created due to incomplete knowledge about their social inﬂuences, we generate a number of settings by varying the level of
knowledge seeded to the agents. More speciﬁcally, we give only a subset of the agent-role mapping to each agent. We do so
by randomly replacing certain 1s with 0s (in the Matrix 5(c)) and give this partial knowledge to the agents during initiali-
sation. Thus, a certain agent may not know all the roles that it or another agent may act. This may, in turn, lead to conﬂicts
within the society, since certain agents may know certain facts about the society that others are unaware of (see Section 4.3
for more details). By controlling this level of change, we generate an array of settings ranging from perfect knowledge (0%
missing knowledge) in the society, to the case where agents are completely unaware of their social inﬂuences (100% missing
knowledge).21
Given an overview of the scenario, we now explain how these agent interactions lead to conﬂicts within this multi-agent
context.
4.3. Computational conﬂicts
As argued in Section 1, usually within a multi-agent society, we can identify two broad forms of computational conﬂicts.
Namely, the conﬂicts of interests that may arise due to the disparate motivations of the individual agents and the conﬂicts
of opinions that may occur due to imperfections of information distributed within the context. We can identify both these
forms of conﬂicts within the above scenario. The following explains these in more detail.
First, the self-interested motivations of our agents give rise to conﬂicts of interests within the system. In more detail, when
an agent attempts to acquire the services of another, it is motivated to pay the lowest amount it possibly can for that service.
This is because the lower an agent’s external service payments are, the higher its own task earnings will be. However, on the
other hand, when agents sell their services, they are motivated to obtain the highest payment they possibly can to maximise
their service earnings (refer to Section 4.1). Thus, whenever agents attempt to convince others to sell their services, the
interaction naturally gives rise to conﬂicts of interest (due to the discrepancy in motivations to pay the minimum when
selling and earn the maximum when buying) between the buyer and seller agents in the system.
The dynamics of interaction become more complicated due to the presence of social inﬂuences within the society. For
instance, an agent may be internally motivated (due to its self-interested desire to maximise its earnings) to perform a
speciﬁc action. However, at the same time, it may also be subject to an external social inﬂuence (via the role it is assuming
or the relationship that it is part of) not to perform it. In such a case, the agent is required to make a choice between its
internal desire and its obligation. If, for instance, the agent decides to pursue its internal motivation at the expense of its
social inﬂuence, this may, in turn, lead to a conﬂict of interest between it and another of its counterparts who may have
an interest in the former abiding by its social inﬂuence. Also an agent may face situations where different social inﬂuences
motivate it in a contradictory manner (one to perform a speciﬁc action and the other not to). In such situations, the agent
is again required to make a choice between which obligation to honour and which to violate. In such an event, if the agent
decides to abide by a certain social inﬂuence and forgo the other, this may also lead to conﬂicts of interest between agents.
Second, within a multi-agent society, the information is usually distributed between the individual agents. Thus, a certain
individual may only possess a partial view about the facts of the society. In particular, when agents interact to achieve their
tasks in the above context, they do so with imperfect knowledge about their social inﬂuences (refer to Section 4.2). Thus,
agents may not be aware of the existence of all the social inﬂuences that could or indeed should affect their and their
counterparts’ actions. Due to this lack of knowledge, agents may fail to abide by all their social inﬂuences, which, in turn,
may lead to conﬂicts. Since the underlying reason for these forms of conﬂicts are imperfections in view points between
agents, these are termed conﬂicts of opinions [73].
For instance, in the above context, a particular agent may not be aware of all the roles that it or another of its counterpart
may act within the society. This may, in turn, lead to conﬂicts since certain agents may know certain facts about the society
that others are unaware of. To explain this further, consider an instance where agent a0 is not aware that it is acting a
certain role r0, which may prescribe it to honour a certain obligation to another agent a1 acting the role r1. Now, when
21 Theoretically, it is possible to introduce imperfections to all aspects of the agents’ knowledge (i.e., the task parameters, the capability parameters,
and the counterparts known within the society). However, since the objective of these experiments is to explore the concept of how arguments can
resolve conﬂicts, instead of designing an exhaustive implementation with all possible imperfections and arguments, we chose to concentrate on resolving
conﬂicts that arise due to imperfect knowledge about their social inﬂuences. In particular, we concentrate on the imperfections that arise due to the lack
of knowledge about the ﬁrst two premises in the schema Act(ai , ri) and Act(a j , r j) (refer to Section 3.1). Thus, conﬂicts may arise due to the agents’ lack of
knowledge about the role they and their counterparts assume within the society. Increasing the imperfections would most likely increase the reasons why
a conﬂict may occur, thus, bringing more arguments into play. Therefore, we believe, this would have little bearing on the general pattern of the results.
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2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted = true ‖ p pmax) do
7: response← Propose(p)
8: if (response = “accept”) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11: if (p = pmax) then
12: p ← getNextViableProposal()
13: end if
14: end if
15: end while
16: return isAccepted
Algorithm 3. The negotiate() method.
these agents interact within the society, a0 may refuse to honour its obligation to a1 (of which it is unaware) and may
refuse to pay any penalty for this violation. Thus, such imperfect information may manifest itself as a conﬂict between the
two agents. Similarly, in an instance where a0 is aware of its role r0, but is unaware that its counterpart a1 acts role r1, it
may also refuse to honour this obligation. In this instance, the agent’s lack of knowledge about the roles of its counterpart
leads to a conﬂict within the society.
Given how different types of conﬂicts arise within the context, we will now detail a number of different ways agents
can use our ABN framework to manage and resolve them through argumentation. As the ﬁrst step to this end, we will next
detail the basic algorithms that agents can use to argue and negotiate in this system.
4.4. Agent interaction
First, we present the negotiation element of the basic ABN algorithm that allows agents to negotiate the services of other
willing and capable counterparts within this social setting (refer to Algorithm 3). In essence, an agent that requires a certain
capability will generate and forward proposals to another selected agent within the community, requesting that agent to sell
its services in exchange for a certain reward. If the receiving agent perceives this proposal to be viable and believes that it
is capable of performing the proposal, then the agent will accept. Otherwise it will reject the proposal. In case of a reject,
the original proposing agent will attempt to forward a modiﬁed proposal. This is done through the getNextViableProposal()
method, which essentially implements the P4 decision mechanism explained in Section 3.4.1. The interaction will end either
when one of the proposals is accepted or when all valid proposals that the proposing agent can forward are rejected. If the
proposing agent could not reach an agreement with that particular responding agent, then it will choose another potential
service provider and will initiate negotiations with that agent. In essence, this is a simpliﬁed version of the protocol speciﬁed
in Section 3.3.2. Here, the two main decision elements within this negotiation are generating and evaluating proposals. In
the following we will discuss how our ABN model presented in Section 3.4 is used to design these two decision elements:22
Proposal Generation: When generating a proposal, an agent needs to consider two aspects: (i) whether it is capable of car-
rying out the reward and (ii) whether the beneﬁt it gains from the request is greater than the cost incurred while performing the
reward (refer to Algorithm 1 in Section 3.4.1). To simplify the implementation, we constrain our system to produce proposals
with only monetary rewards. Given this, by slight abuse of notation, we will use m to represent the action “pay monetary
amount m”. Thus, the generic proposal from an agent ai to an agent a j takes the form Propose(ai,a j,do(a j, θ j),do(ai,m))
where θ j is the requested action and m the monetary reward. In this context, calculating the beneﬁt and the cost becomes
straight forward. The beneﬁt is the request u j associated with the action θ j and the cost of reward is m the monetary
reward. Using this, the agent can generate an array of proposals with increasing amounts of monetary rewards, the lowest
being 1 and the highest being (u j − 1).
Proposal Evaluation: When the receiving agent evaluates a proposal it also considers two analogous factors: (i) whether
it is capable of performing the request and (ii) if the beneﬁt it gains from the reward is greater than the cost of carrying out
the request (refer to Algorithm 2). To evaluate capability, the agent compares its own level with the minimum required to
perform the action. In case of viability, the cost of performing the request is the current opportunity cost. Here, if the agents
are not occupied, the cost is the minimum asking price (set to μ the mean reward value, see Section 4.1), or, if they are, it is
the reward plus the de-commitment cost of the previously agreed action. The beneﬁt, in the simplest case, is the monetary
22 It is important to note that this implementation represents but one instantiation of how agents can interact within our framework. We analyse a
number of different variations in Section 5.
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2: Hr ← challengeJustiﬁcation()
3: {Generate personal justiﬁcation}
4: Hp ← generateJustiﬁcation()
5:
6: if (isValid(Hr) = false) then
7: {Assert invalid premises of Hr }
8: else
9: {Adopt premises of Hr into personal knowledge}
10: end if
11: if (isValid(Hp) = false) then
12: {Correct invalid premises of Hp within personal knowledge}
13: else
14: {Assert Hp}
15: end if
Algorithm 4. The argue() method.
value of the reward m. However, if the agent has a social commitment to provide that capability type to the requesting
agent, then the beneﬁt is the monetary reward plus the de-commitment penalty of this social commitment.
Given the negotiation interaction, we will now detail how agents argue to resolve conﬂicts that may arise due to the
knowledge imperfections present within their multi-agent society (such as the one highlighted in Section 4.2). In order to
resolve such a conﬂict, agents must ﬁrst be able to detect it. In this context, they do so by analysing the de-commitment
penalties paid by their counterparts for violating their social commitments. Speciﬁcally, an agent with the right to demand
a certain capability would claim the penalty from its counterpart if it believes that the latter has violated its obligation. To
reduce the complexity, here, we assume that agents do not attempt to deceive one another.23 Thus, an agent will either
honour its obligation or pay the penalty. However, due to agents having imperfect knowledge about their context (see
Section 4.2), in certain instances a counterpart may not be fully aware of all its obligations and may pay a penalty charge
different to what it should have paid. For instance, in the example scenario presented in Fig. 5, since agent a0 acts the role
r0 and agent a1 acts the role r1, a0 has the obligation to provide capability c1 to a1 or pay 100 for violating that obligation.
However, if agent a0 is unaware that its counterpart a1 is acting r1, it will not pay any penalty charge for refusing to
provide c1. In such an instance, since the actual amount paid (0) in response is different from the amount it expects to
receive (100), the agents would detect the existence of a conﬂict.
Once such a conﬂict is detected, agents attempt to argue and resolve it by exchanging their respective justiﬁcations (refer
to Algorithm 4). As the ﬁrst step, the proponent would challenge its respondent’s justiﬁcation (via the challengeJustiﬁcation()
method) for paying the de-commitment penalty value that the respondent believes it is obligated to pay. These justiﬁcations
take the form of the social inﬂuence schema (see formulae (5) and (6) in Section 3.1). For instance, an agent may say that
it paid a certain penalty value px because it believes it is acting the role ri and its counterpart acts the role r j , and due to
the relationship between ri and r j it believes that it entails an obligation Ox which demands a payment of px in the event
of its violation. Similarly, an agent may say it paid a zero amount as its penalty because it couldn’t ﬁnd any justiﬁcation as
to why it should pay a certain penalty. Once the proponent receives its counterpart’s justiﬁcation, it can generate its own
justiﬁcation (via the generateJustiﬁcation() method) as to why the counterpart should pay the penalty value it believes it has
the right to demand.
By analysing these two justiﬁcations, agents may uncover certain inconsistencies between the different premises within
these justiﬁcations. As highlighted in Algorithm 4 there can four possible cases. First, the proponent may ﬁnd that one of the
reasons given as support by its respondent may be invalid. In such an event, agents can use the social arguments highlighted
in Section 3.2.1 (i.e., 1.i, 1.ii, 1.iii, etc.) to argue about these justiﬁcations by disputing those premises which they deem
invalid (see line 7 in Algorithm 4). Second, after close examination (or after further questioning), the proponent may ﬁnd
one his own reasons to be invalid. In such an instance, the agent can correct these invalid premises within its own personal
knowledge (see line 12 in Algorithm 4). Even if both the justiﬁcations are valid, they can still be inconsistent due to the
incomplete knowledge between the two agents. For example, an agent may have paid a certain penalty because it believes
that its counterpart acts a certain role (which in fact is correct). However, the agent may be missing the knowledge that the
counterpart also acts in another role which give its counterpart the right to demand a higher penalty charge. Such missing
knowledge can be in both the proponent and the respondent, which gives rise to the ﬁnal two cases. In such instances,
agents can use the social arguments highlighted in Section 3.2.1 (i.e., 2.i, 2.ii, 2.iii, etc.) to assert such missing knowledge by
pointing out these alternative justiﬁcations and thereby overcoming such imperfections within their knowledge (see lines 9
and 14 in Algorithm 4).
One important functionality required to achieve these arguments is the ability to determine the validity of these
premises. This is generally referred to as the defeat-status computation and is an extensively researched area within
23 This is an assumption used right through the course of this paper as intentional deception and lying are beyond the scope of this study.
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stabilising models [5], and different forms of heuristics [7,40,60]. However, here we do not attempt to re-invent a new
defeat-status computation model. Since we are mainly interested in the systemic impact of ABN in an agent society, in our
implementation, we abstract away this functionality by using a validation heuristic which simulates a defeasible model such
as [3]. More speciﬁcally, the validation heuristic considers a given basic premise and returns true or false depending on
its validity, thereby, simulating a defeasible model or an arbitration model. In our experiments, we also vary the accuracy
level of this heuristic and experiment with the effect of having inaccuracies and failures of this defeat-status computation
mechanism on the argumentation process (refer to Section 5.2.1).
Having successfully mapped our ABN framework to a computation context, next we present a series of ABN strategies and
empirically analyse how they would allow agents to both effectively and eﬃciently resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent
society.
5. Empirical evaluation
Given the experimental context, we now present a detailed empirical evaluation on how agents can use our ABN
framework (proposed in Section 3) to argue and negotiate eﬃciently and effectively in a multi-agent society. To this end,
Section 5.1 ﬁrst speciﬁes our experimental settings. Thereafter, we present a series of strategies that agents can use to argue
effectively to resolve conﬂicts within a social context. For each strategy, we specify detailed algorithms and empirically eval-
uate their relative performance beneﬁts to the agent society. In so doing, we empirically identify a set of general conditions
and guidelines on when and how argumentation can enhance the performance of a multi-agent society.
5.1. The experimental setting
The experiments are set within an argumentation context with 30 agents, each interacting with one another to negotiate
willing and capable counterparts to achieve their actions (as speciﬁed in Section 4). In this task environment, each agent is
assigned a number of actions that vary randomly between 20 and 30. Each action is associated with a reward that is set
according to a normal distribution with a mean 1000 and a standard deviation of 500. In addition, each agent is assigned
all three types of capabilities, but their level of competence for each type varies randomly between 0 and 1.
To enable us to analyse how agents can use ABN to resolve conﬂicts within this society, we incorporate a rich social
structure into our experimental context. In particular, we embody an array of roles, relationships, and social commitments
into the agent society. In more detail, ﬁrst we assign a set of roles to each agent within the context. In order to avoid a
predisposition towards any speciﬁc specialised form of a social context we assign the roles to agents in a random manner.
The maximum number of roles within the society varies between different experiments. These roles are then connected via
relationships which, in turn, contain a series of social commitments associated with them as described in Section 4.2. These
social commitments entail agents with rights to demand, question, and require other agents to perform particular actions
and obligations to do so when requested.
In our experiments, we do not assume that agents have perfect knowledge about the social structure within which they
operate. Therefore, having mapped this social structure, we then vary the level of knowledge about this social structure
seeded into our agents. Thereby, we create an array of experimental settings where agents have different levels of imperfec-
tions in their knowledge about the structure and its inﬂuences. This level of imperfection varies between 0 to 100, where
0 indicates perfect knowledge and 100 represents a complete lack of knowledge. Such imperfections, in turn, dictate the
number of conﬂicts of opinion present within the society; the greater the lack of knowledge about the society, the greater
the number of potential conﬂicts between the agents.
Given both the task environment and the social context, we now explain the two metrics used to evaluate the overall
performance of the different ABN strategies in our experiments:24
• Effectiveness of the Strategy: We use the total earnings of the population as a measure of effectiveness of ABN strategies.
If this value is higher, the strategy has been more effective in handling the conﬂicts. Therefore, it has allowed agents to
ﬁnd willing and capable counterparts to perform their actions more effectively within the society. On the other hand, if
the value is lower, the strategy presents a less effective means of resolving conﬂicts.
• Eﬃciency of the Strategy: This reﬂects the computational cost incurred by the agents while using a particular strategy
to resolve conﬂicts within the society. We use the total number of messages exchanged between all agents within the
society during the interaction as a metric to measure this effect. This provides a good metric because longer interactions,
which usually takes a higher number of messages to complete, tend to consume more resources from the agents to
generate, select, and evaluate such messages and also generally consume increased bandwidth within the system. On
the other hand, shorter interactions, which tend to consume fewer resources, only incur a smaller number of messages.
Thus, the number of messages exchanged has a strong correlation to the amount of resources used within the system.
More speciﬁcally, a strategy that involves fewer messages is said to have performed more eﬃciently in resolving conﬂicts
than one that uses a higher number.
24 These metrics are not novel to our work, both Jung et al. [31] and Ramchurn et al. [60] used similar measures in their empirical work.
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Summary of the simulation parameters.
Simulation Parameter Value
Number of agents within the society 30
Number of capability types 3
Level of capability d ∈ [0,1]
Number of actions per agent 20∼30
Reward value per action (ui) ui ∼ N(μ,σ 2); μ = £1000; σ = £500
Given our experimental settings, we now proceed to detail the different ABN strategies and empirically evaluate their
ability to resolve conﬂicts within a multi-agent society. All reported results are averaged over 30 simulation runs to diminish
the impact of random noise, and all observations emphasised are statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.25 In
each simulation run, all agents are allowed to iterate through all their actions, trying to negotiate (either successfully or
unsuccessfully) the services of others to accomplish those actions.
5.2. Strategies, results and observations
Having described our experimental settings, in the following we analyse a series of ABN strategies that agents may use
to argue and resolve conﬂicts within such a multi-agent context. In designing these different strategies, we draw inspiration
from our social inﬂuence schema and demonstrate a number of different ways that agents can argue to resolve conﬂicts
in a social context. We in turn measure the relative performance beneﬁts (both in terms of eﬃciency and effectiveness)
of using these strategies to derive guidelines on how argumentation can be constructively used within a multi-agent soci-
ety.
In particular, we analyse three major ways that agents can argue and negotiate to resolve conﬂicts within our experi-
mental multi-agent society. The ﬁrst and the second methods focus on how agents can socially inﬂuence each others’ decisions
by arguing about their social inﬂuences and, thereby, effectively and eﬃciently overcoming conﬂicts of opinions present
within an agent society. The motivation for these two methods stems from our social inﬂuence schema (see Section 3.1),
which gives the agents different rights in the event where an obligation is violated; namely the right to demand com-
pensation (see Section 5.2.1) and the right to challenge non-performance (see Section 5.2.2) of social commitments. Third,
we shift our focus to how agents can negotiate their social inﬂuences (see Section 5.2.3) and, thereby, attempt to negoti-
ate and resolve certain conﬂicts by way of trading and re-allocating social inﬂuences within our experimental multi-agent
context.
In each case, these strategies help us to investigate a number of important hypotheses related to the use of argumenta-
tion in a multi-agent society. In the following three sections (Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3) we explain these strategies in
detail, highlight the respective hypotheses under investigation, present our experimental results, and analyse the observa-
tions.
5.2.1. Demanding compensation
If an agent violates a certain social commitment, one of the ways its counterpart can react is by exercising its right to
demand compensation. This formulates our baseline strategy. In particular, it extends our negotiation algorithm by allowing
the agents to demand compensation in cases where negotiation fails. Once requested, the agent that violated its social com-
mitment will pay its counterpart the related penalty (refer to Algorithm 5). We term this strategy Claim_Penalty_Non_Argue
(CPNA). However, in imperfect information settings, a particular agent may violate a social commitment simply because it
was not aware of it (i.e., due to the lack of knowledge of its roles or those of its counterparts, as explained in Section 5.1).
In such situations, an agent may pay a de-commitment penalty different to what the other agent believes it should get,
which may, in turn, lead to a conﬂict. In such situations, our second strategy, titled Claim_Penalty_Argue (CPA), allows agents
to use social arguments to argue about their social inﬂuences (as per Section 3.2.1) and, thereby, manage their conﬂicts.
Algorithms 5 and 6 deﬁne the overall behaviour of both these strategies.
Here, our hypothesis is that by allowing agents to argue about their social inﬂuences we are providing them with a
coherent mechanism to manage and resolve their conﬂicts and, thereby, allowing them to gain a better outcome as a
society. To this end, the former strategy, CPNA, acts as our control strategy and the latter, CPA, as the test strategy. Figs. 6(a)
and 6(b) show our main results from which we make the following observations:
25 The statistical signiﬁcance tests are commonly used in sampling theory to approximately predict the population mean (μ), within a certain error range,
using a known sample mean (x) and sample variance (s2). For instance, for a sample size of n, the population mean is stated to range between the limits
μ = x± t ∗ (s/√n ). Here, the parameter t increases or decreases the error element (t ∗ (s/√n )), which, in turn, is said to determine the level of conﬁdence
in this approximation. For small samples, this t parameter follows the Student’s t distribution, which, in turn, speciﬁes the certain t value to be used in
order to attain approximations at different levels of conﬁdence. For instance, to attain a 95% conﬁdence level for both upper and lower limits (termed
as two-tail) in a population size of 30, it speciﬁes a t value of 2.042. Against this background, all our graphs and results use this notion to calculate the
standard statistical error in the results (for more detail refer to [13]).
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2: if (isAccepted = false) then
3: compensation ← demandCompensation()
4: end if
Algorithm 5. Claim_Penalty_Non_Argue (CPNA) strategy.
1: isAccepted ← negotiate()
2: if (isAccepted = false) then
3: compensation ← demandCompensation()
4: if (compensation < rightToPenalty) then
5: argue()
6: end if
7: end if
Algorithm 6. Claim_Penalty_Argue (CPA) strategy.
Fig. 6. Eﬃciency and effectiveness of the argue and non-argue strategies.
Observation 1. The argumentation strategy allows agents tomanage conﬂicts related to their social inﬂuences even at high uncertainty
levels.
Fig. 6(a) shows a downward trend in the population earnings as the agents’ knowledge level about their social inﬂuences
decrease (0 on the X-axis indicates perfect information, whereas 100 represents a complete lack of knowledge). This trend
is present in both the CPNA and CPA strategies. In essence, the reason for this trend is the agents’ awareness of their
social inﬂuences. Speciﬁcally, if agents are aware of their social inﬂuences, they may use these as parameters within their
negotiations. Thereby, in certain instances, they can use these social inﬂuences to endorse their actions which may otherwise
get rejected (see Section 3.2.2). Thus, if agents are aware of their social inﬂuences it would, in turn, increase their population
earnings as more actions are accomplished. On the other hand, if the agents are unaware of their social inﬂuences, they
may not be able to use these to endorse such actions. Thus, this downward trend depicts this social phenomenon within
our results.
In Fig. 6(a), we can also observe that the population earnings when using the non-argue strategy (CPNA) decreases more
rapidly than the argue one (CPA). The reason for this is because the argue method within CPA allows agents to manage
and resolve certain conﬂicts of opinion that they may have about their social inﬂuences. For instance, if a certain agent is
unaware of a role that another acts, it may correct this missing knowledge through arguing with that agent as explained in
Section 5.1. Thus, arguing allows agents to correct such gaps in their knowledge and, thereby, resolve any conﬂicts that may
arise as a result.
We can observe this even more clearly in Figs. 7(a) and 7(b), which plot the percentage of information known to the
agents during the course of their interactions. For instance, Fig. 7(a) shows how agents start their interaction with only 60%
of knowledge (40% missing) about their social inﬂuences and, when using the CPA strategy, argue between one another
and become increasingly aware of their social inﬂuences during the course of their interaction (reaching approximately 90%
by end of the simulation). On the other hand, since the non-arguing CPNA strategy leaves such conﬂicts unresolved, this
knowledge remains missing right through the course of the interaction (the 40% missing knowledge remains constant in
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Fig. 7(a)). In this manner, ABN allows the agents to manage their conﬂicts, become more aware about their social inﬂuences,
and function more effectively as a society even at high uncertainty levels (e.g., 40% to 80% as seen in Fig. 6(a)).
Observation 2. At all knowledge levels, the argumentation strategy exchanges fewer messages than the non-arguing one.
Fig. 6(b) shows the number of messages used by both strategies under all knowledge levels. Apart from the two end
points, where argumentation does not occur (see Observation 3), we can clearly see the non-arguing strategy exchanging
more messages (therefore, performing less eﬃciently) than the argue one. The reason for this is that even though agents
do use some number of messages to argue and correct their incomplete knowledge, thereafter they use their corrected
knowledge in subsequent interactions. However, if the agents do not argue to correct their knowledge imperfections, they
negotiate more frequently since they cannot use their social inﬂuences to endorse their actions. Thus, this one-off increase
of argue messages becomes insigniﬁcant when compared to the increase in the propose, accept, and reject messages due to
the increased number of negotiations. For instance, at 50% level of missing knowledge, when agents interact using the CPNA
strategy (which does not allow them to argue) they use on average 335,424 messages for negotiation. However, when using
the CPA strategy (which allows them to argue) in the same settings, they use on average only 294,322 messages; a 12.5%
reduction in negotiation messages in exchange for a 0.2% increase in argumentation messages (see Fig. 8).
When taken together, these two observations give support to the hypothesis that allowing agents to argue about their
social inﬂuences does indeed provide agents a coherent mechanism to resolve conﬂicts, and thereby, gain a better (more
effective and eﬃcient) outcome as a society. Given this, we now attempt to qualify this claim by investigating how this
value of social argumentation varies under three different conditions. First, we explore two extreme conditions; (i) when the
society has perfect information and (ii) when there is complete uncertainty about the social context (see Observation 3).
Second, we investigate this value of arguing about social inﬂuences, when the number of social inﬂuences available within
the society varies (from sparse to abundant; see Observation 4). Third, we experiment with what happens if the agents’
arguing mechanism fails to deliver a precise outcome in each and every occasion. In so doing, we explore how such fail-
ures in the argumentation mechanism impact the effectiveness of the agent society to perform as a coherent unit (see
Observation 5).
Observation 3. In cases of perfect information and complete uncertainty, both strategies perform equally.
The reason for both strategies performing equally when there is perfect information (refer to 0% in Fig. 6(a)) is because
there are no knowledge imperfections. Therefore, in such situations, agents do not need to engage in argumentation to
correct conﬂicts of opinions simply because such conﬂicts do not exist.
On the other hand, the reason for both strategies performing equally when there is a complete lack of knowledge is
more interesting (refer to 100% level in Fig. 6(a)). Here, since all the agents within the society are unaware of any social
inﬂuences (even though they exist), they are not able to detect any conﬂicts or violations. Consequently, agents do not resort
to arguing to manage such conﬂicts (agents must ﬁrst recognise a conﬂict before they can argue and manage it; refer to
the protocol speciﬁcation in Section 3.3.2). Thus, when there is a complete lack of knowledge, the CPA strategy that allows
arguing performs identically to the non-arguing CPNA one.
Observation 4. When there are more social inﬂuences within the system, the performance beneﬁt of arguing is only signiﬁcant at high
levels of knowledge incompleteness.
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Figs. 9(a) through to 9(f) show the effectiveness of both the strategies as the number of roles increases within the
society from 3 to 20. One of the key observations here is the declining rate of the non-argue strategy. We can see that
as the number of roles increase, the rate of decline of the non-argue method becomes less pronounced. Furthermore, the
crossover point, where the non-argue method starts to be less effective than the argue strategy, also shifts increasingly to
the right (i.e., higher knowledge imperfections).
This again is a very interesting observation. As agents gain a higher number of roles, they acquire an increasing number
of social inﬂuences. Now, as explained in Observation 1, the agents use these social inﬂuences as a resource to endorse
their actions. Thus, when an agent has a higher number of social inﬂuences, its lack of knowledge about a certain particular
inﬂuence makes little difference. The agent can easily replace it with another inﬂuence (which it is aware of) to convince its
counterpart. Therefore, under such conditions, agents arguing about their social inﬂuences to correct their lack of knowledge
would have little reward since the non-argue method can more simply replace it with another known inﬂuence and still
achieve the same end. In such high resource settings, only when an agent has a near complete lack of knowledge (i.e., 80–
90% levels) does the argue strategy yield signiﬁcant performance gains. This observation complements our previous study on
the worth of argumentation at varying resource levels [35], where we show that the beneﬁt of arguing is more pronounced
at low resource settings and under higher resource conditions is less beneﬁcial.
The experiments thus far assume that, if a conﬂict occurs about the validity of a certain premise (i.e., a particular agent
acts a certain role within the society), the related parties have the ability to provide suﬃcient justiﬁcation to clearly ascer-
tain whether it is indeed valid or invalid (refer to Algorithm 4). Therefore, in such situations, the defeat-status computation
mechanism only needs to decide between two possibilities; whether the premise in question is valid or invalid. However,
in most realistic societies, agents may fail to provide suﬃcient justiﬁcation to precisely determine the outcome of every
argument. Thus, when arguing in such situations, the defeat-status computing algorithm now needs to take into account a
third possibility: undetermined, indicating that the given justiﬁcation is not suﬃcient and it requires more justiﬁcation to
clearly ascertain its validity (refer to Section 3.4.1). In such situations, the argumentation mechanism will fail, leaving the
conﬂict unresolved. To incorporate such social conditions and to evaluate the performance of ABN under such failures, we
next alter our ABN strategy, CPA, to devise a new ABN strategy CPA-with-n%-Failure. Here, n represents the level of failure,
or more precisely, the percentage of times the defeat-status algorithm fails to deliver a clear outcome. We experiment with
this strategy in relation to both CPA and CPNA. The results are presented in Fig. 10 from which we draw the following
observation.
Observation 5. Failure to reach agreements reduces the effectiveness of ABN. However, even with high levels of failure, the ABN strategy
will still out perform the non-arguing approach.
Figs. 10(a) through to 10(f) clearly show that the CPA-with-n%-Failure strategy deteriorates in performance as the num-
ber of failures increase. For instance, the CPA-with-40%-Failure (refer to Fig. 10(c)) allows agents to resolve more conﬂicts
and achieve a higher total earning than the CPA-with-60%-Failure strategy (refer to Fig. 10(d)). Thus, the failure to reach
agreements reduces the effectiveness of the ABN strategy. However, we can observe that still, even with 60% or 80% failures,
the ABN strategy (CPA-with-n%-Failure) still performs more effectively than the non-arguing CPNA one.
5.2.2. Questioning non-performance
In the event that a particular social commitment is violated, apart from the right to demand compensation, our social
inﬂuence schema also gives the agents the right to challenge and demand a justiﬁcation for this non-performance (see
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Section 3.1). It is generally argued in ABN theory that allowing agents to exchange such meta-information in the form of
justiﬁcations gives them the capability to understand each others’ reasons and, thereby, provides a more eﬃcient method of
resolving conﬂicts under uncertainty [59]. Here we attempt to empirically evaluate this general hypothesis in a multi-agent
context (i.e., with more than two agents). In particular, we believe that providing the agents with the capability to challenge
and demand justiﬁcations for violating social commitments allows them to gain a wider understanding of the internal and
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social inﬂuences affecting their counterparts. Thereby, we believe, it will provide a more eﬃcient method for managing
social inﬂuences in the presence of incomplete knowledge.
To test this underlying hypothesis we extend our previous best strategy Claim_Penalty_Argue (CPA) to design two addi-
tional strategies; Argue_In_First_Rejection (AFR) and Argue_In_Last_Rejection (ALR). Both these strategies allow the agents to
challenge non-performance of social commitment, but at different stages within the negotiation encounter. More speciﬁcally,
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2: p ← p0
3: isAccepted ← false
4:
5: {Loop till either the agent agrees or the last proposal fails.}
6: while (isAccepted = true ‖ p pmax) do
7: response← Propose(p)
8: if (response= “accept”) then
9: isAccepted ← true
10: else
11:
12: {Challenge to ﬁnd reason if the ﬁrst proposal is rejected.}
13: if (p = p0) then
14: reasonsToRefuse ← Challenge(p)
15: if (reasonsToRefuse = notCapable) then
16: requestedCapability ← reasonsToRefuse
17: updateMyKnowledge(agent, requestedCapability)
18: else if (reasonsToRefuse = notViable) then
19: threasholdPrice ← reasonsToRefuse
20: updateMyKnowledge(agent, time, threasholdPrice)
21: deemedCompensation ← reasonsToRefuse
22: if (deemedCompensation < rightToPenalty) then
23: argue()
24: end if
25: end if
26: end if
27:
28: if (p = pmax) then
29: p ← getNextViableProposal()
30: end if
31: end if
32: end while
33:
34: if (isAccepted = false) then
35: compensation ← demandCompensation()
36: end if
Algorithm 7. The Argue_In_First_Rejection (AFR) strategy.
the former allows agents to challenge after the receipt of the ﬁrst rejection and the latter after the last rejection. Thus,
the two differ on when agents attempt to ﬁnd the reason (in the ﬁrst possible instance or after all proposals have been
forwarded and rejected). To formulate these two strategies we extend our CPA algorithm, by incorporating a challenge phase
into its negotiation element in order to ﬁnd the reason for rejecting a proposal. In the case of AFR, this challenge is em-
bedded after the ﬁrst proposal is rejected, while in the case of ALR it is embedded after the rejection of the ﬁnal proposal.
Algorithm 7 speciﬁes the AFR strategy. The ALR merely alters when to challenge to ﬁnd reason; i.e., the test condition in
line 13 of the Algorithm 7 is altered to if (p = pmax) then. Given this, Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) show our results and the following
highlight our key observations:
Observation 6. The effectiveness of the various argumentation strategies are broadly similar. However, allowing the agents to challenge
earlier in the dialogue, signiﬁcantly increases the eﬃciency of managing social inﬂuences.
Fig. 11(a) shows no signiﬁcant difference in the effectiveness of the three ABN strategies. This is due to the fact that all
three strategies argue and resolve the conﬂicts even though they decide to argue at different points within the encounter.
Therefore, we do not expect to have any signiﬁcant differences in the number of conﬂicts resolved. Thus, the effectiveness
stays the same.
However, Fig. 11(b) shows a signiﬁcant difference in the number of messages used by the three strategies at all levels of
knowledge. In particular, the number of messages used by the Argue_In_Last_Rejection (ALR) strategy is signiﬁcantly lower
than our original Claim_Penalty_Argue (CPA) one. Moreover, the Argue_In_First_Rejection (AFR) strategy has the lowest number
of messages exchanged.
The reason for this behaviour is based on how the agents use these reasons exchanged during the argue phase. In the
CPA strategy the main objective of arguing is to resolve the conﬂict regarding the penalty value that should be paid. How-
ever, it does not attempt to ﬁnd out the actual reason why the counterpart rejected the proposal and failed to honour
its social commitment in the ﬁrst place. For instance, a certain agent may fail to honour a speciﬁc social commitment
simply because it does not possess the necessary capability level to carry out the requested action. It may also be occu-
pied at the requested time and may perceive this action to be less viable to de-commit from than its prior agreement.
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By challenging for the reason for the rejection, the latter two strategies allow the requesting agent to gain such meta-
information and use them both in their current encounter and any subsequent ones. For instance, if a certain agent refuses
to perform a speciﬁc action because it does not have the necessary capability level, then the requesting agent can ex-
clude that counterpart from any future service requests that may require a capability level the same or greater than the
refused action. If its counterpart refused the proposal because it is not viable, then by challenging the reasons for re-
fusal, agents can also gain knowledge about their current asking price (the price at which it would become viable). Agents
can then use this information to straight away forward a proposal that meets this asking price, rather than sequentially
incrementing its offering rewards which would eventually get rejected. In this manner, such reasons give useful meta-
information, which the agents can use in their future negotiations. Since the AFR and ALR strategies allow the agents to
challenge, obtain, and exploit such information, they allow the agents to interact more eﬃciently as a society than when
using CPA.
Moreover, the AFR strategy, which allows agents to argue in the ﬁrst rejection, provides this information earlier in the
negotiation encounter, which, in turn, gives the agents more potential to exploit such information (even during the present
negotiation) than getting it in the last encounter (as in ALR). Given this, we can conclude that, in our context, allowing
the agents to challenge non-performance earlier in the negotiation allows them to manage their social inﬂuences more
eﬃciently as a society.
Finally, in this line of experiments, we design a strategy that allows agents to reveal information selectively after taking
into consideration the future consequences of such revelation. In more detail, in certain instances, an agent may act certain
roles that may entail more obligations than rights. In such instances, it would be to the advantage of that agent not to
reveal that information to its counterparts. In this manner, agents may choose to exploit the lack of knowledge of their
counterparts and, thereby, play a more self-interested strategy by choosing to forgo certain rights to obtain a long term gain
by not carrying out (or paying violation penalties for) its obligations.
To explain this more clearly, consider our simple supervisor student example detailed in Section 1 with two agents Andy
and Ben; Andy playing the role of a Ph.D. student and Ben the role of his supervisor. Now, assume that Ben, due to this
supervisory role, gains a single right (i.e., to demand the student to submit the thesis on time) and two obligations (i.e.,
to correct the student’s papers and to provide ﬁnancial aid) towards his student. Due to the imperfect information present
within the society, in certain instances, Andy may not be aware of either the fact that Ben assumes the role of supervisor
or that he himself assumes the role of student. Due to this missing knowledge, in either case, Andy would not be aware of
the corresponding obligations and the rights he has towards Ben. In such instances, if the supervisor Ben believes that his
two obligations cost more than the beneﬁt he gains from exercising his right, Ben may play a more self-interested strategy
and exploit Andy’s lack of knowledge by choosing not to reveal this information. Thereby, Ben may choose to forgo his less
important right in the view of a long term potential to violate his two obligations without any de-commitment penalty, and
thus play a more self-interested strategy within the society.
Here, our motivation is to explore the broad implication of agents using such a self-interested strategy to manage their
social inﬂuences within a society. In order to test the impact of this behaviour, here we alter our current best strategy, AFR,
and allow agents to evaluate the long term beneﬁts and costs before revealing information about their social inﬂuences
within the argumentation process. More speciﬁcally, we modify our argue function speciﬁed in Algorithm 4 and introduce
an additional test condition before all assertions (refer to Algorithm 8). This test condition (the isAssertViable method)
evaluates the long term beneﬁt by calculating the total beneﬁt of the rights that the agent would gain minus the cost
of obligations it would incur in the event of revealing a certain piece of information to its counterpart. We then use
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2: Ho ← challenegeJustiﬁcation()
3: {Generate personal justiﬁcation}
4: Hp ← generateJustiﬁcation()
5:
6: if (isValid(Ho) = false) then
7: if (isAssertViable(Ho) = true) then
8: {Assert invalid premises of Ho}
9: end if
10: else
11: {Adopt premises of Ho into personal knowledge}
12: end if
13: if (isValid(Hp) = false) then
14: {Correct invalid premises of Hp within personal knowl-
edge}
15: else
16: if (isAssertViable(Hp) = true) then
17: {Assert Hp}
18: end if
19: end if
Algorithm 8. The selectiveArgue() method.
Fig. 12. Eﬃciency and effectiveness of the AFR and the SAFR strategies.
this modiﬁed selectiveArgue() method in place of the argue() function in line 23 of the AFR Algorithm 7 to formulate our
selective argue strategy. We identify this strategy as Selective_Argue_In_First_Reject (SAFR). Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) plot both the
effectiveness and eﬃciency of using this SAFR strategy in comparison to AFR from which we make the following observation.
Observation 7. Allowing agents to selectively reveal information reduces the performance of the society both in terms of effectiveness
and eﬃciency.
In Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) we can clearly observe a slight (yet signiﬁcant) decrease in the overall performance of the society
when agents are using SAFR in comparison to AFR. Both in terms of effectiveness and eﬃciency, it is clear that when using
SAFR the agents as a society tend to achieve a lower overall earnings value (see Fig. 12(b)) and also use a higher number
of messages (see Fig. 12(b)) to accomplish this lower outcome. The difference is more pronounced at settings with higher
levels of missing knowledge (i.e., 70%, 80%, 90% levels).
To help us explain the reason for this behaviour, Figs. 13(a) through to 13(b) plot the percentage of information known
to the agents during the course of their interactions while using both these strategies. In these we can observe that when
using SAFR, because the agents selﬁshly choose not to reveal information about their social inﬂuences in instances where it
is to their individual long term disadvantage, certain conﬂicts within the society remains unresolved. This, in turn, causes the
percentage of information known to the agent to increase at a much slower rate (see Figs. 13(a) through to 13(b)) than when
using AFR. Moreover, a signiﬁcant proportion of information still remains missing even at the end of the simulation (see
the 70% and 80% levels in Figs. 13(c) and 13(d)). This missing knowledge leaves the agents unaware of a certain number of
their social inﬂuences. Since the agents cannot use these inﬂuences to endorse their actions, the society as a whole achieves
a smaller number of actions. Therefore, when individual agents play this self-interested selective argumentation strategy,
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the agent society as a whole performs less effectively. Furthermore, due to the information about their social inﬂuences
propagating slowly and some remaining missing, agents are unable to use them to endorse their actions and, thus, need to
negotiate more with their counterparts to accomplish their actions. These increased negotiations use a signiﬁcantly higher
number of propose, accept, and reject messages, thereby, increasing the total message count used within the society. Thus,
not only does this self-interested selective ABN strategy make the agent society less effective, but it also makes it less
eﬃcient.
5.2.3. Negotiating social inﬂuence
In addition to acting as a mechanism for resolving conﬂicts of opinion in relation to social inﬂuences, ABN can also enable
agents to augment their negotiation process by way of incorporating threats and promises along with their proposals (refer
to Section 3.2). More speciﬁcally, within a social context, agents can use negotiation as a tool to trade social inﬂuences by
incorporating these as additional parameters within the negotiation object. Allowing them to do so would, in turn, enhance
their ability to bargain and, in certain instances, increase their chances of reaching mutually acceptable agreements within
a society.
This acts as the main underlying hypothesis in our following experiments. In essence, here we use our argumentation
model to design two extended ABN strategies that allow agents to trade their social inﬂuences while arguing within our
experimental context. In particular, our agents attempt to negotiate for the services of their counterparts. While doing
so, agents may, in certain instances, ﬁnd that they do not have the necessary ﬁnances to meet the demands of their
counterparts. In such situations, agents may be able to endorse such actions with additional social inﬂuences, by way of
trading away some of their existing rights to inﬂuence, which they believe to be either redundant or less important to
attaining their overall objectives. Since, within our context, the degree of inﬂuence associated with each speciﬁc social right
or obligation is reﬂected by its associated de-commitment penalty, agents have the ability to trade away such rights and
obligations in exchange for another by simply negotiating this penalty charge. For example, if an agent desires to increase
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2:
3: {If the maximum possible proposal for an action is refused.}
4: if (isAccepted= false && p = pmax) then
5: {Attempt to negotiate social inﬂuences from the current time slot that are redundant.}
6: substituteRight ← ﬁndSubstituteCurrentRedundent()
7: if (substituteRight = null) then
8: negotiateRights(currentRightInNeed, substituteRight)
9: response← Propose(p)
10: if (response= “accept”) then
11: isAccepted ← true
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15:
16: if (isAccepted = false) then
17: compensation ← demandCompensation()
18: end if
Algorithm 9. Argue_First_Reject-Negotiate_Current_Redundant (AFR-NCR).
the inﬂuence of a certain social right in exchange for a decrease of another, it can do so by negotiating with its counterpart
and agreeing to increase the penalty charge associated with the former right in exchange for a decrease of the latter. In this
manner, these extended strategies allow agents to increase the inﬂuence of a certain social right at the expense of another,
presumably a less important one, and thereby negotiate social inﬂuences to achieve their actions.
We implement both these extended strategies by enhancing our current best ABN algorithm, AFR (Algorithm 7). More
speciﬁcally, in these we allow agents to trade their social inﬂuences in the event that their basic negotiation interaction
(trading with proposals) has been unsuccessful in reaching an agreement. In such instances, both of these strategies al-
low agents to trade an existing social right it may have, in exchange for a stronger one with a higher penalty value and,
thus, a higher inﬂuence. However, they differ in the manner in which they select this replaceable right to inﬂuence. The
ﬁrst strategy, AFR-NCR (Argue_First_Reject-Negotiate_Current_Redundant), allows agents to choose a redundant social right
that they may have upon the same counterpart to demand a different capability type within the same time-slot. Since,
within our context, agents have only a single action, which requires only a single capability per time slot, any rights that
might have demanded another capability type would be redundant towards their overall objectives. Thus, in this strategy,
the agents are allowed to trade those redundant capabilities in exchange for increasing the inﬂuence of a more required
right.
On the other hand, the second strategy, AFR-NFLI (Argue_First_ Reject-Negotiate_Future_Less_Important), allows agents to
ﬁnd their substitute right from a future action that they believe to be less important than the current one. In more detail, if
a certain action has a higher reward value, then the agent can afford to spend more to convince another agent to perform
it (refer to the proposal generation algorithm in Section 5.1 where the maximum monetary offer is deﬁned as the reward
value for action r j − 1). Since an agent can afford to spend more on such actions, it can utilise any social inﬂuences it
may have on others in order to accomplish its more ﬁnancially constrained ones (i.e., actions with a lower reward, and,
therefore, more ﬁnancially constrained). Using this as the main intuition, the AFR-NFLI strategy allows agents to trade these
less important social inﬂuences in exchange for supplementing actions that fail to even meet the initial asking price of their
counterparts.
To this end, Algorithm 9 speciﬁes the operation of our AFR-NCR strategy. In essence, here we ﬁrst allow the basic AFR
algorithm to negotiate an agreement. However, if it fails to do so, then the extended strategies allow the agents to select a
substitute right and use its social inﬂuence to negotiate with their counterparts. In particular, the AFR-NCR uses the func-
tion ﬁndSubstituteCurrentRedundent() to ﬁnd this substitute right (see line 6 of Algorithm 9). The AFR-NFLI merely alters
the way that these agents select these substitute rights and uses an alternative function ﬁndSubstituteFutureLessImportant()
in place of the above line 6. Having speciﬁed these extended strategies, Figs. 14(a) and 14(b) plot their performance (both
in terms of effectiveness and eﬃciency) in comparison to our AFR strategy and the following analyses our main observa-
tions.
Observation 8. Allowing agents to negotiate social inﬂuence enhances the effectiveness of the society.
Fig. 14(a) shows a clear increase in the total earnings of the population when the agents are allowed to trade their social
inﬂuences. In particular, both the extended strategies, AFR-NCR and AFR-NFLI, outperform the original AFR strategy; allowing
the agents a means of performing more effectively within a social context. We can explain the reason for this observation
as follows. As explained in Observation 1, social inﬂuences act like a resource for the agents to endorse their actions. In
such a context, when these agents are allowed to trade their social inﬂuences, they gain the opportunity to re-allocate
these resources in a more useful manner. In more detail, both strategies allow agents the opportunity to supplement certain
actions that require such an endorsement in exchange for foregoing certain social inﬂuences that are either redundant or
less useful. This, in turn, allows the agents to achieve a higher number of actions.
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More speciﬁcally, while using AFR in our simulations, agents were capable of completing 61.5% (with a 0.8% standard
error) of their actions on average. However, when they were allowed to trade social inﬂuence, both the strategies signiﬁ-
cantly increased this completion level allowing agents to reach 69.4% (0.6% standard error) with AFR-NCR and 71.9% (0.7%
standard error) with AFR-NFLI. This signiﬁcant increase in the number of actions completed, allowed the agents to increase
their earnings, thereby, performing more effectively as a society. When comparing AFR-NCR and AFR-NFLI, the latter allowed
agents to perform more effectively as a society. The reason for this depends on how successful the agents are in ﬁnding
a substitute social inﬂuence to trade with. In the former case, agents constrain themselves to only the current time slot,
whereas the latter allows them to search through a number of future time-slots. This, in turn, increases the probability of
AFR-NFLI successfully ﬁnding a substitute to trade with, thus, signiﬁcantly enhancing its effectiveness.
Observation 9. When agents negotiate social inﬂuences they also achieve their tasks more eﬃciently as society.
Fig. 14(b) shows a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of messages used by the agents when they are allowed to trade
their social inﬂuences within a society. More speciﬁcally, agents used a total of 112164 messages when using the AFR
strategy. However, when using AFR-NCR this number is reduced by 10.1% and with AFR-NFLI by 13.8%. As explained above,
when agents are allowed to trade social inﬂuences, they are able to re-arrange their inﬂuences in a more suitable manner
to endorse their actions. As a result, this increases the probability of reaching an agreement with their counterparts within
the current encounter. Due to this increased success in their current negotiation encounters, agents are less likely to be
required to iterate through the society ﬁnding alternative counterparts and exhaustively negotiating with each other to reach
agreements. This, in turn, signiﬁcantly reduces the negotiation messages (open-dialogue, close-dialogue, propose, reject)
used within the society and out numbers the small increase in the messages used by the agents to trade social inﬂuences.
Furthermore, the AFR-NFLI strategy (in comparison to AFR-NCR) allows agents to perform at a much higher eﬃciency level
within the society. Again this is because the AFR-NFLI strategy is less constrained than the AFR-NCR strategy (i.e., not
constrained only to the current slot, but allows them to search through an array of future time slots) in allowing agents to
ﬁnd a successful substitute to trade with.
6. Conclusions and future work
This paper centres around two broad areas of AI; namely argumentation-based negotiation and multi-agent systems.
In particular, we present a novel ABN framework that allows agents within structured societies to argue, negotiate, and
resolve conﬂicts in the presence of social inﬂuences. The framework is theoretically grounded, successfully mapped into a
computational context, and empirically evaluated to identify a number of different ways that agents can use ABN to enhance
the performance of an agent society (see Sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively). In so doing, this paper makes a contribution to
both the theory and practise of argumentation in multi-agent systems. The following highlights these main contributions in
more detail.
In essence, our ABN framework is composed of four main elements: (i) a schema that captures how agents reason about
inﬂuences within a structured society, (ii) a mechanism to use this stereotypical pattern of reasoning to systematically iden-
tify a suitable set of social arguments, (iii) a language and a protocol to exchange these arguments, (iv) and a decision making
functionality to generate such dialogues. These four elements interact in a coherent and systematic manner (see Section 3).
In more detail, the schema that captures agents’ social reasoning is used to extract the social arguments. The language
(more speciﬁcally the domain language) ﬂows naturally from this schema and, in turn, is used to encode these social ar-
guments. In addition, the communication component of the language is strongly linked to the protocol that deﬁnes the
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sion mechanisms to present a coherent and a comprehensive model for agents to argue and negotiate within a structured
society.
One of the distinguishing features of this framework is that it explicitly takes into consideration the societal element
of a multi-agent system (the social structure and the different inﬂuences within it) and, in turn, investigates how this
impacts the way these agents argue and negotiate within such a community (see Section 3.1). In particular, by using the
social inﬂuence schema, we explicitly capture social inﬂuences endemic to structured agent societies and identify a number
of different ways agents can use these inﬂuences constructively in their argumentative dialogues. Even though a number
of authors have highlighted the importance of the inﬂuences of the society in the argumentation process [59,61], no one
has previously presented a framework to capture this element. Existing work tends to focus on two agent contexts which
largely ignores the impact of the society. Analysing systems based on such frameworks gives only a partial picture of the
systemic effect of ABN in multi-agent systems (refer to [34] for more details). In contrast, our framework, which explicitly
captures these inﬂuences of a society, leads the way to a thorough analysis on the constructive interplay between ABN and
social inﬂuences. In so doing, this paper extends the state of the art in the application of argumentation in multi-agent
systems.
From the argumentation theory point of view, analogous to argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and for expert
opinion [79], our social inﬂuence schema presents a novel argumentation scheme for reasoning within structured societies.
Moreover, the way we used our schema to systematically identify arguments within an agent society (see Section 3.2)
also presents a successful attempt to use such schemes in computational contexts. This is a developing area of research
in argumentation literature, where a number of authors have conceptually argued for the potential of such schemes in
computational contexts [62,78]. This work, in line with Atkinson et al. [4], contributes to this ﬁeld. In particular, while
Atkinson et al. present a model that explores the use of argumentation schemes for practical reasoning, this paper presents
the use of such schemes for social reasoning in multi-agent systems.
In addition, the protocol and the language elements in conjunction with the decision functions present a comprehen-
sive dialogical model to automate argumentative dialogues to manage conﬂicts in multi-agent systems (see Sections 3.3
and 3.4). In so doing, it enhances the contribution of this paper to both the argumentation and multi-agent systems com-
munities. More speciﬁcally, here, we present a protocol for agents to argue, negotiate, and manage conﬂicts in structured
multi-agent systems. Similar to the work by McBurney et al. [47], we ground our protocol by specifying its semantics both
in axiomatic and operational terms. Even though grounded in a similar manner, our protocol achieves a different purpose.
More speciﬁcally, while McBurney et al. present a protocol for consumer purchase negotiations, the language and protocol
deﬁned in this paper allow agents to manage conﬂicts related to social inﬂuences in multi-agent systems. Moreover, we
go a step further than McBurney et al. in our domain. In particular, while McBurney et al. explore the completeness of
their protocol by explaining its operation in a number of case studies, we deﬁne concrete algorithms, implement them,
and experiment with how an agent society can use our model to resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent task allocation sce-
nario.
The types of social arguments and the strategies designed in this paper identify an array of ways in which argumen-
tation can be useful in multi-agent systems (see Section 3.2). More speciﬁcally, this paper identiﬁes two major ways of
using argumentation in multi-agent systems; namely argue about social inﬂuences and negotiate social inﬂuences. In a broader
sense, both these techniques capture inspiration from human societies and signify how humans argue and negotiate to
enhance their performance within a social context. In particular, the former allows individuals to correct their misconcep-
tions and, thereby, overcome certain ineﬃciencies due to incomplete information present within the society. The latter, on
the other hand, allows individuals within the society to trade away less useful social inﬂuences, and, thus, re-organise
their inﬂuence structure to suit the current task environment. In this manner, both these methods allow a society of
individuals to achieve a higher level of collective performance. In bringing these socially inspired techniques forward, mod-
elling them within an argumentation context, and encoding such behaviour in a computational environment, this paper
also makes contributions not only to the argumentation community, but also to the broader computer science commu-
nity.
Given these distinct theoretical contributions, the second set of contributions of this paper come from our work in
helping to bridge the theory to practise divide in argumentation research. Most existing argumentation frameworks fail to
address this divide. They tend to focus more on the theoretical soundness and the completeness of their models and ignore
the computational costs associated with them. Typically, they either present no implementations of their models or, in very
rare instances, present limited experiments in highly constrained two agent contexts. Thus, the gap between the theory and
the practise in argumentation research is well documented [41,59]. In contrast, we use our theoretical model to formulate
concrete algorithms and, in turn, use them to implement the various decision functions connected to our protocol (refer
to Section 4). In so doing, we successfully map our theory into a computational context and implement an array of ABN
strategies to resolve conﬂicts in a multi-agent task allocation scenario.
In addition to extending the state of the art in forwarding a fully implemented ABN model, we also successfully use this
model to develop a number of conﬂict resolution strategies into our argumentation context (see Section 5). In particular,
our strategies capture inspiration from both the social science and multi-agent systems literature (i.e., exercising the right
to claim compensation, question non-performance, negotiating social inﬂuence) and represent an array of ways in which
agents can manage conﬂicts in a multi-agent society (refer to Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3). Thus, our experiments are
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icated to that context. By mapping these diverse set of strategies within our framework we exemplify its versatility and
ﬂexibility.
Last, but not least, the results of our experiments also contribute to ABN in multi-agent systems research via a number
of interesting ﬁndings (see Section 5.2). In essence, ﬁrst we allow agents to exercise their right to demand compensation
when managing conﬂicts. In particular, here we design two strategies; one that merely demands and collects compensa-
tion (non-ABN) and the other that allows agents to resort to argumentation to resolve any discrepancies that may arise
while negotiating such compensations (ABN). Our results show that allowing agents to use an ABN mechanism to do so
enhances their ability to resolve conﬂicts even at high uncertainty levels. This, in turn, shows ABN to be a more eﬃcient
and effective strategy when compared to a non-arguing approach (refer to Observations 1, 2, and 3). However, we also
show that this comparative advantage diminishes as the number of social inﬂuences (which act as resources) increase
within the context (refer to Observation 4). This latter observation further justiﬁes our previous experimental result on
the negative correlation of the beneﬁt of arguing and resources available within the context [35]. Given this, next, we
experimentally consider the effectiveness of our ABN strategy in the presence of failures (inability to reach agreements
due to the lack of suﬃcient justiﬁcation). Here, our observations show that failures do indeed reduce the effectiveness
of our ABN strategy. However, even with high levels of failure, it still out performs the non-arguing approach (refer to
Observation 5). Next in our experiments, we allow agents to exercise their right to question the non-performance in the
event of a conﬂict and, thereby, allow them to argue about the reason for the conﬂict. Here, our results show that al-
lowing agents to challenge for the reason earlier in their encounter (as opposed to using it as the last resort) enhances
their eﬃciency in managing conﬂicts (refer to Observation 6). Next, in this line of experiments, we design a strategy that
allows agents to selectively reveal information. The results show that allowing agents to do so, reduces the rate of infor-
mation propagation within the society, and, therefore, lowers both the eﬃciency and effectiveness of their performance
(refer to Observation 7). Finally, we design a set of strategies that allow agents to negotiate their social inﬂuences. Here,
we observe that allowing them to do so, enhances their ability to re-allocate these social inﬂuences in a more useful man-
ner. Thus, this achieves a more eﬃcient and effective way of managing conﬂicts within a society (refer to Observations 8
and 9).
This paper also opens the pathway to a number of areas of interesting future exploration. One possible direction is to
enhance the framework in order to enable the agents to learn and adapt their argumentation strategies to different individu-
als and conditions. In more detail, in our current framework, agents use the social inﬂuence schema to extract arguments.
Since this schema captures the stereotypical behaviour of the society, these extracted arguments would be effective against
a typical agent that operates within the context. However, if agents have different individual characteristics, certain argu-
ments or argumentation techniques may work better with certain individuals (i.e., socially inﬂuencing decisions may be a
better way of managing conﬂicts with understanding individuals since you can reason with them, rather than resorting to
threatening them while negotiating social inﬂuences). Furthermore, in certain instances, the settings within the argumenta-
tion context may change (i.e., agents may ﬁnd a better information source, which gives them an increasing level of access
to global knowledge). In such instances as well, certain argumentation strategies may again provide a more effective way
of managing conﬂicts. In such dynamic situations, if the agents can learn and adapt their strategies to suit the individual
or the context, it would provide a more effective way of arguing in such diverse and dynamic environments. This can be
achieved by incorporating a learning model into the current ABN framework, thus, allowing agents to adapt their argumen-
tation strategies based on their experience on the past encounters. One possibility here would be a re-enforcement learning
technique [32] that allows agents to proﬁle their counterparts or certain contexts based on their success or failure in their
previous encounters. Another angle of future research would be to incorporate issues such as trust and reputation into the
agents’ argumentation strategy and, thereby, make the framework more applicable within an open agent environment [30].
More speciﬁcally, the current model considers two issues; viability and feasibility during generating and evaluating pro-
posals (see Section 3.4). By extending these decision functions, agents can consider parameters such as trustworthiness or
the reputation level of the other party. In all of these aspects, our framework provides a good point of departure for such
investigations within multi-agent systems.
Another potential area of future research is to analyse (both in a theoretical and an experimental manner) how agents
can reason about social inﬂuences at a cognitive level; especially with the possibility to selectively violate certain obligations
and the normative implications of such violations. One of the main challenges in formalising such a system is to model the
notion of obligation. General deontic logic prescribes that an agent entails an intention to perform its obligations. However,
such a model would fail to recognise the agents’ ability to selectively violate such obligations. This is famously known as the
contrary-to-duty reasoning problem in deontic logic [76]. A good example is the moral dilemma experienced by the Sartre’s
soldier; the obligation by duty to kill and the moral obligation not to kill. Logicians have deﬁned two main approaches
to handle this problem. The ﬁrst follows a practical reasoning approach which deﬁnes two basic models on obligations: a
conﬂict-tolerant model [9] and prima-facie obligations [65]. The alternative is to follow a more mainstream formal approach
similar to preference-based dyadic obligations approach suggested by [76]. Even though a number of authors have tried
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Therefore, this remains a potential area of future research.
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Appendix A. Notational representation of social argument
Here, we give both the natural language and the notational representation of all social arguments listed in Section 3.2
to both socially inﬂuence decisions (refer to Table A.1) and negotiate social inﬂuences (refer to Table A.2). All arguments
stated are from the point of view of agent ai . Due to space restrictions, here we use an abbreviated form and do not ex-
plicitly state the two agents involved in the argument in our notational representation. Therefore, for instance the argument
Assert(ai,a j,¬Act(ai, ri)) is presented in the abbreviated form as Assert(¬Act(ai, ri)). Also, to save space, in Table A.2 we
use the abbreviated notation ±do() to denote the different combinations of do() and ¬do().
Table A.1
Social arguments to socially inﬂuence decisions.
Natural Language Representation Notational Representation
1. Dispute (Dsp.) existing premises to undercut the opponent’s existing justiﬁcation.
i. Dsp. ai is acting debtor role ri Assert(¬Act(ai , ri))
ii. Dsp. a j is acting creditor role r j Assert(¬Act(a j , r j))
iii. Dsp. ri is related to the relationship p Assert(¬RoleOf(ri , p))
iv. Dsp. r j is related to the relationship p Assert(¬RoleOf(r j , p))
v. Dsp. SC is associated with the relationship p Assert(¬AssocWith(SCri⇒r jθ , p))
vi. Dsp. f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with O Assert(¬InﬂuenceOf( f ,O)
vii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with O Assert(¬ActionOf(O, θ))
viii. Dsp. θ is the action associated with  Assert(¬ActionOf(, θ))
2. Point out new premises about an alternative schema to rebut the opposing decision.
i. P-o ai is acting the debtor role ri Assert(Act(ai , ri))
ii. P-o a j is acting the creditor role r j Assert(Act(a j , r j))
iii. P-o ri is related to the relationship p Assert(RoleOf(ri , p))
iv. P-o r j is related to the relationship p Assert(RoleOf(r j , p))
v. P-o SC is a social commitment associated with the
relationship p
Assert(AssocWith(SC
ri⇒r j
θ , p))
vi. P-o f is the degree of inﬂuence associated with the
obligation O
Assert(InﬂuenceOf( f ,O))
vii. P-o θ is the action associated with the obligation O Assert(ActionOf(O, θ))
viii. P-o θ is the action associated with the right  Assert(ActionOf(, θ))
ix. P-o ai ’s obligation O to perform Assert(O
ai⇒r j
θ )
x. P-o a j ’s right to demand, question and require the
action θ
Assert(a j⇒riθ )
3. Point out conﬂicts that prevent executing the decision to rebut the opposing decision.
(a) Conﬂicts with respect to O
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due
toward the same role
Assert(O
ai⇒r j
θ ∧ O
ai⇒r j
θ ′ ∧ Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ ′)))
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different obligations due
toward different roles
Assert(O
ai⇒r j
θ ∧ Oai⇒rkθ ′ ∧ Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ ′)))
(b) Conﬂicts with respect to 
i. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert
inﬂuence upon the same role
Assert(a j⇒riθ ∧ 
a j⇒ri
θ ′ ∧ Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ ′)))
ii. P-o a conﬂict between two different rights to exert
inﬂuence upon different roles
Assert(a j⇒riθ ∧ 
a j⇒rk
θ ′ ∧ Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ ′)))
(c) Conﬂicts with respect to θ and another action θ ′ such
that (i) θ ′ is an alternative to the same effect as θ ;
(ii) θ ′ either hinders, obstructs, or has negative side
effects to θ
Assert(Conﬂict(do(θ),do(θ ′)))
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Social arguments to negotiate social inﬂuences.
Natural Language Representation Notational Representation
4. Use the obligation (O) as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or
many future obligations if the other agent
performs (or not) a certain action θ
Propose(do(a j , θ),do(ai ,adopt(O
ai⇒a j
θ ′ )))
Propose(do(a j , θ),¬do(ai ,adopt(Oai⇒a jθ ′ )))
Propose(¬do(a j , θ),do(ai ,adopt(Oai⇒a jθ ′ )))
Propose(¬do(a j , θ),¬do(ai ,adopt(Oai⇒a jθ ′ )))
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or
many existing obligations if the other agent
performs (or not) a certain action θ
Propose(±do(a j , θ),±do(ai ,drop(Oai⇒a jθ )))
5. Use the right () as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Promise not to (or threaten to) exercise the right
to inﬂuence one or many existing obligations if
the other agent performs (or not) a certain action
θ
Propose(±do(a j , θ),±do(ai ,drop(ai⇒a jθ ′ )))
6. Use third party obligations and rights as a parameter of negotiation.
(a) Third party obligations
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or
more future obligations toward ak to perform θ ′ ,
if a j would (or would not) exercise its right to
inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ
Propose(±do(a j ,a j⇒alθ ),±do(ai ,adopt(Oai⇒akθ ′ )))
ii. Promise to (or threaten not to) honour one or
more existing obligations toward ak to perform
θ ′ , if a j would (or would not) exercise its right to
inﬂuence a certain agent al to perform θ
Propose(±do(a j ,a j⇒alθ ),±do(ai ,drop(Oai⇒akθ ′ )))
(b) Third party rights
i. Promise to (or threaten not to) exercise the right
to inﬂuence one or many existing obligations
toward ak to perform θ ′ , if a j would honour its
existing obligation to perform θ
Propose(do(a j ,O
ai⇒a j
θ ),¬do(ai ,drop(ai⇒akθ ′ )))
Propose(¬do(a j ,Oai⇒a jθ ),do(ai ,drop(ai⇒akθ ′ )))
7. Use P as a parameter of negotiation.
i. Threaten to terminate p (its own relationship
with a j ) or p′ (a third party relationship that ai
has with ak), if the agent a j performs (or not) a
certain action θ
Propose(±do(a j , θ),do(ai ,drop(p)))
Propose(±do(a j , θ),do(ai ,drop(p′)))
ii. Threaten to inﬂuence another agent (ak) to
terminate its relationship p′′ with a j , if a j
performs (or not) a certain action θ
Propose(±do(a j , θ),do(ai ,ai⇒akdo(ak ,drop(p′′))))
Appendix B. Operational semantics
Here we present an operational semantics for the multi-agent communications protocol whose syntax is given in Sec-
tion 3.3. As explained in Section 3.5, this semantics considers the effects of legal agent utterances as if they were program
language commands acting on a virtual computer. In deﬁning this semantics we bring together the protocol, which deﬁnes
the rules of the interaction, with the internal decision-making mechanisms of the agents participating in the interaction.
In the following paragraphs, we label the thirty-one transition rules of the operational semantics with the symbols “TR1”,
“TR2”, etc.
We deﬁne our semantics using the labelled terminal transition system (LTTS) [54]. In more detail, the LTTS deﬁnes the
operation of a system as a series of tuples 〈Γ, A,→, T 〉, where Γ represents a set of conﬁgurations, A a set of labels,
→ : Γ × A × Γ deﬁnes a transition relation, and T a set of terminal (or ﬁnal) conﬁgurations; i.e., ∀γ ∈ T , γ ′ ∈ Γ,α ∈ A
such that (γ ,α,γ ′) →. Conventionally, (γ1,α,γ ′2) → is sometimes written γ1
α−→γ2. This method of specifying operational
semantics can be used at different levels of detail, and what counts as one transition for one purpose may be represented
through many transitions when viewed in more detail [54].
In our speciﬁcation, a conﬁguration γ ∈ Γ is itself a tuple [ai, P ,o], where ai is an agent, P is a decision mechanism
being executed by agent ai , and o is an output of the decision mechanism. Labels denote locutions (general message types)
that cause the transition from one conﬁguration to another (possibly in a different agent). Thus, the intuitive meaning of
a transition statement [ai, P1,o1] L−→[a j, P2,o2] is that if we were in a conﬁguration where agent ai executes mechanism
P1 leading to output o1, then after sending a message through locution L, the system moves to a conﬁguration where
agent a j executes mechanism P2 leading to output o2. In certain instances, we also use the above notation to capture
internal transitions where a certain internal decision mechanism leads to another state within an agent. Such transitions
do not involve communications between different agents, but only changes in the internal state of a single agent. For this
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statements, we usually refer to output schema as opposed to speciﬁc output instances. Moreover, in certain instances we
use the ‘.’ notation to denote any type of output for a given mechanism. Finally, a special state T is used to denote the
terminal state of the system. Given this, the following speciﬁes the operational semantics of our ABN system and Fig. B.1
captures its operational ﬂow.
TR1 If the agent does not require the services of another to accomplish a certain action θ , it will not require any argumen-
tation, thus, will move to the terminal state T . To evaluate whether or not the agent requires the services of another,
it would use its decision mechanism P1 Recognise Need:
[
ap,P1,noNeedService(θ)
] → [ap,P1, T ]
TR2 If the agent recognises that it requires the services of another to accomplish a certain action, it will initiate a dialogue
with that agent through the L1: OPEN-DIALOGUE locution. Similar to above, the agent uses the P1: Recognise Need
decision mechanism to evaluate whether or not it requires the services of another. When its counterpart receives this
locution it will initiate its decision mechanism R1: Consider Participation.
[
ap,P1,needService(θ)
] L1−→[ar,R1, .]
TR3 When an agent receives an invitation to enter into a dialogue via the L1: OPEN-DIALOGUE locution, it will indicate its
readiness via its own L2: OPEN-DIALOGUE locution. Once the proponent receives this reply it will, in turn, initiate the
decision mechanism P2: Generate Proposals attempting to formulate a viable and a feasible set of proposals.
[
ar,R1,enterDialogue(θ)
] L2−→[ap,P2, .]
TR4 Once an agent has generated a feasible and a viable set of proposals, it will initiate its own decision mechanism P3:
Rank Proposals in order to obtain an ordered ranking on this set.
[
ap,P2, Q (θ)
] → [ap,P3, .]
TR5 Once the proposals are ranked, the agent will initiate its own P4: Select Proposal mechanism to a select a proposal to
forward to its counterpart.
[
ap,P3, S(θ)
] → [ap,P4, .]
TR6 If there is no other proposal left to select (i.e., all possible proposals were forwarded and justiﬁably rejected) and
the P4: Select Proposal mechanism returns null (∅), then the agent will initiate its own P11: Terminate Interaction
mechanism to end the dialogue.
[ap,P4,∅] → [ap,P11, .]
TR7 If the P4: Select Proposal decision mechanism returns a proposal (i.e., P4 will only return proposals that have not been
previously forwarded and justiﬁably rejected within the encounter), then the agent will forward it to its counterpart
via a L3: PROPOSE locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate the decision mechanism R2: Evaluate Proposal
to consider whether to accept or reject this proposal.
[
ap,P4, Si(θ)
] L3−→[ar,R2, .]
TR6 If the respondent decides to accept the current proposal within its R2: Evaluate Proposal mechanism, then it will
indicate its decision via the L4: ACCEPT locution. Once a proposal is accepted, the proponent will initiate the decision
mechanism P11: Terminate Interaction to bring the dialogue to an end.
[
ar,R2,accept
(
Si(θ)
)] L4−→[ap,P11, .]
TR9 If the respondent decides to reject the current proposal within its R2: Evaluate Proposal mechanism, then it will
indicate its decision via the L5: REJECT locution. Once received, this Reject will prompt the proponent to initiate the
mechanism P5: Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate, to decide its next course of action.
[
ar,R2, reject
(
Si(θ)
)] L5−→[ap,P5, .]
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its own decision mechanism P11: Terminate Interaction to bring the dialogue to an end.
[
ap,P5, terminate
(
Si(θ)
)] → [ap,P11, .]
TR11 If the proponent decides to continue negotiating with its counterpart (via P5), it will attempt to select and forward
an alternative proposal to that agent. In order to select this alternative, the proponent will initiate its own decision
mechanism P4: Select Proposal.
[
ap,P5, continue
(
Si(θ)
)] → [ap,P4, .]
TR12 The proponent may decide (via P5) to challenge its counterpart to establish the reason for rejecting its current pro-
posal. In such cases, the proponent will construct an L6: CHALLENGE locution in order to challenge its counterpart
for its justiﬁcation to reject the proposal. Once a respondent receives such a challenge, it will, in turn, initiate its
own R3: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism that will search within its knowledge-base (or formulate) the reason for the
corresponding rejection.
[
ap,P5, challengeReject
(
Si(θ)
)] L6−→[ar,R3, .]
TR13 When the respondent extracts its justiﬁcation for rejecting the proposal (using its decision mechanism R3), it will
assert this via an L8: ASSERT locution to its counterpart. Once received, this will initiate the proponent’s decision
mechanism P6: Evaluate Justiﬁcations, which will attempt to compare its own justiﬁcation with its counterpart’s and
analyse the cause of the conﬂict.
[ar,R3, Hr] L8−→[ap,P6, .]
TR14 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent still requires more information to evaluate the validity of one of its
counterpart’s premises (lr ∈ Hr), it will attempt to acquire this knowledge via challenging this assertion via the L7:
CHALLENGE locution. This will, in turn, restart the opponent’s R3: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism.
[
ap,P6,needMoreJustiﬁcation(lr)
] L7−→[ar,R3, .]
TR15 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent still requires more information to evaluate the validity of one of its own
premises (lp ∈ Hp), it will restart its own P7: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism to establish the reasoning behind this
premise.
[
ap,P6,needMoreJustiﬁcation(lp)
] → [ap,P7, .]
TR16 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds a premise within its own justiﬁcation lp to be invalid, then it will
initiate its P8: Update Knowledge mechanism to update its own knowledge-base correcting the invalid premise.
[
ap,P6, invalid(lp)
] → [ap,P8, .]
TR17 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds all premises within its counterpart’s justiﬁcation Hr to be valid, then
it will initiate its P8: Update Knowledge mechanism to update its own knowledge by inserting this valid justiﬁcation
into its knowledge-base.
[
ap,P6,valid(Hr)
] → [ap,P8, .]
TR18 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds a premise within its counterpart’s justiﬁcation lr to be invalid, then it
will dispute this premise through an L9: ASSERT locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate its R4: Consider
Premise mechanism to consider updating the invalid premise within its knowledge-base.
[
ap,P6, invalid(lr)
]
L9−→[ar,R4, .]
TR19 While evaluating justiﬁcations, if the agent ﬁnds all premises within its own justiﬁcation Hp to be valid, then it will
assert its justiﬁcation through an L8: ASSERT locution. Once received, the respondent will initiate its R4: Consider
Premise mechanism to consider inserting this justiﬁcation into its knowledge-base.
[
ap,P6,valid(Hp)
] L8−→[ar,R4, .]
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then it will extract this justiﬁcation H ′p where H ′p  lp from its knowledge and pass it back into its P6: Evaluate
Justiﬁcations mechanism.
[
ap,P7, H
′
p
] → [ap,P6, .]
TR21 While considering a particular premise, if the respondent’s R4: Consider Premise decision mechanism requires more
justiﬁcation to accept a particular premise, it will challenge the proponent for this further justiﬁcation. Once received,
this L7: CHALLENGE will trigger the proponent’s P7: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism to extract further justiﬁcations.
[
ar,R4,needMoreJustiﬁcation(l)
] L7−→[ap,P7, .]
TR22 Once the proponent’s P7: Extract Justiﬁcation mechanism has extracted further justiﬁcation in response to a particular
challenge by the respondent, it will forward this justiﬁcation H ′ via a L8: ASSERT locution. This will initiate the
respondent’s R4: Consider Premise mechanism to reconsider the relevant premise with this additional justiﬁcation.
[ap,P7, H ′] L8−→[ar,R4, .]
TR23 While considering a particular premise l, if the respondent’s R4: Consider Premise decision mechanism decides to
accept that premise, it will incorporate (either update or insert) that into its knowledge-base. Once the knowledge
its updated, it will, in turn, trigger the respondent’s own R5: Consider Counter Argument mechanism to search for a
possible counter argument within its updated knowledge-base.
[
ar,R4,knowledgeUpdate(l)
] → [ar,R5, .]
TR24 Once the proponent updates its knowledge with a particular premise l via the P8: Update Knowledge mechanism,
it will trigger the proponent’s own P9: Consider Counter Argument mechanism to search for a possible counter
argument within its updated knowledge-base.
[
ap,P8,knowledgeUpdate(l)
] → [ap,P9, .]
TR25 Within the P9: Consider Counter Argument mechanism, if the proponent ﬁnds a valid counter argument it will restart
its own P6: Evaluate Justiﬁcation mechanism with this additional argument.
[
ap,P9,hasCounterArg(Hp)
] → [ap,P6, .]
TR26 Within the R5: Consider Counter Argument mechanism, if the respondent ﬁnds a valid counter argument, it will
forward this argument via a L8: ASSERT locution to the proponent. This will, restart the proponent’s P6: Evaluate
Justiﬁcation mechanism with this additional argument.
[
ar,R5,hasCounterArg(Hr)
] L8−→[ap,P6, .]
TR27 If the proponent, within its P9: Consider Counter Argument mechanism does not ﬁnd a valid counter argument, it
will initiate its own P10: Terminate Challenge mechanism to terminate this challenge.
[
ap,P9,noCounterArg()
] → [ap,P10, .]
TR28 If the respondent, within its R5: Consider Counter Argument mechanism does not ﬁnd a valid counter argument,
it will indicate its agreement to the challenge to the proponent via a L8: ASSERT locution. Once, received, this will
initiate the proponent’s P10: Terminate Challenge mechanism.
[
ar,R5,noCounterArg()
] L8−→[ap,P10, .]
TR29 Once initiated, the proponent’s P10: Terminate Challenge mechanism will take steps to terminate the current chal-
lenge. Then it will initiate its own decision mechanism P5: Find Justiﬁcation, Continue Negotiation, or Terminate
thus, transferring control again back to the main negotiation strategy selection algorithm.
[
ap,P10,evaluationComplete()
] → [ap,P5, .]
TR30 If the proponent decides to terminate the dialogue it will indicate this via a L10: CLOSE-DIALOGUE locution. Once the
respondent receives this, it will, in turn, initiate its own R6: Terminate Interaction decision mechanism.
[
ap,P11,exitDialogue(θ)
] L10−→[ar,R6, .]
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via a L11: CLOSE-DIALOGUE locution. Thus, at this time both the proponent and the respondent will terminate their
interaction. Once completed, the argumentation system would move to the terminal state T .
[
ar,R6,exitDialogue(θ)
] L11−→[ap,P11, T ]
Fig. B.1. Operational ﬂow.26
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